DOW-UAP-D121 — AAWSAP DIRD, Pulsed High-Power Microwave Source Technology, January 2010
File DOW-UAP-D121 is a declassified pdf from Department of War, recording an incident dated 1/28/10 at Las Vegas, Nevada, published in Release 06 (2026-09-18). This page carries the original file, its official summary and its full text.
- File
- DOW-UAP-D121
- Agency
- Department of War
- Incident date
- 1/28/10
- Location
- Las Vegas, Nevada
- Released in
- Release 06 (2026-09-18)
- File type
Topics: AAWSAP & DIRDs
This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed.
This DIRD surveys pulsed high-power microwave (HPM) source technology and argues that such systems remain of military interest because they can disrupt or damage electronic systems with short, intense electromagnetic pulses. The report reviews the main source types and the supporting technologies they depend on, including high-voltage insulation, switching, cathode materials, antennas, and pulse-power generation. It emphasizes the difficulty of building systems that are compact, efficient, and practical to field, since short pulse durations, antenna size, heating, detectability, and beam or signal quality all impose hard engineering limits. Its overall conclusion is that the technology has significant potential military value, but that further progress depends on advances in cathodes, predictive modeling, high-speed high-voltage switching, and low-loss insulation, while compact ultrawideband systems will remain difficult because of basic physical constraints on antenna design.
Open original file · WAR.GOV page
TL;DR
Las Vegas 2010: where the only thing hotter than the desert was the microwave research.
- DIRD D121, DoW, Jan 2010, incident 1/28/10, Las Vegas, NV
- Surveys pulsed high-power microwave sources, tech components, and military-use challenges
- Concludes significant military potential, but progress limited by cathode, switching, insulation, antenna constraints
AI summary
A technical report on pulsed high-power microwave (HPM) source technology prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the AAWSA program in January 2010. The document describes HPM sources, critical technologies, and applications, including military uses for electronic attack and effects on electronics. It mentions a 2001 incident involving a U.S. The report covers insulation materials, cathode materials, switching technologies, and various HPM sources such as split-cavity oscillators, virtual cathode oscillators, and the Orion system. It also includes details on UWB antenna technologies and their applications.
Full text
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UNCLASSIFIED//POR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
Defense
SSE Intelligence
4 Reference
Document
Acquisition Threat Support
28 January 2010
ICOD: 1 December 2009
DIA-08-0912-005
Pulsed High-Power Microwave
Source Technology
UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR OF CIAL USE ONLY
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Pulsed High- Power Microwave Source Technology
Prepared by:
Acquisition Support Division (DW0-3)
Defense Warning Office
Directorate for Analysis
Defense Intelligence Agency
Author:
AAP Person 64
Administrative Note
COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the photographs in this publication is not aut horized.
This product is one in a series of advanced technology reports produced in FY 2009
under the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Warning Office's Advanced Aerospace
Weapon System Applications (AAWSA) Program. Comments or questions pertaining to
this document should be addressed to !AAP Person 1
AAWSA Program
Manager, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: CLAR/DW0-3, Bldg 6000, Washington,
DC 20340-5100 .
I
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Contents
Summary. ..vi
Critical Technologies .. 1
Insulation 1
Uniform Homogeneous. 2
Solid. 2
Plastics...... 2
Epoxies ... 3
Urethanes and Silicones .... 4
Liquids .. 4
Gaseous ....
Laminated. 6
Plastic-Paper-Oil ... 6
Plastic-Paper-Epoxy .. 6
Dielectric Tapering .
Cathode Materials . 7
Velvet....
Carbon . 9
Ceramics . 10
Cesium Iodide Coated 10
High-Voltage Switching. 11
Gaseous Switching .. 12
High-Speed Liquid Switching.... 14
Solid-State Switching ..… 14
High-Voltage Pulse Sources .. 15
Marx Generators … 15
Transformer Based Generators .... 16
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Explosively Driven Generators ......................................................................... 16
Pulsed High-Power Microwave Sources ................................................................ 17
Pulsed Electron Beam Sources ......................................................................... 17
BWOs, TWTs, and RKAs ..................................................................................... 17
Split-Cavity Oscillators ..................................................................................... 18
Virtual Cathode Oscillators ............................................................................... 18
Magnetrons ...................................................................................................... 18
Gyrotrons ......................................................................................................... 19
Impulse HPM Sources ...................................................................................... 20
SNIPER............................................................................................................. 20
EMBL ................................................................................................................ 20
H-Series HPM Sources ...................................................................................... 20
The Phoenix HPM Source .................................................................................. 22
The GEM II HPM Source ................................................................................... 24
The Jolt HPM source ......................................................................................... 24
Mesoband Sources ........................................................................................... 24
HPM Antennas ...................................................................................................... 25
Narrowband Antennas...................................................................................... 25
Wideband and Ultrawideband Antennas ........................................................... 27
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 29
Figures
Figure 1. Paschen Curve for Air ............................................................................ 13
Figure 2. Example of Marx Generator Circuit ........................................................ 16
Figure 3. Orion HPM Testing Facility....................................................................... 19
Figure 4. Active Denial System With FLAPS Antenna ............................................ 20
Figure 5. H2 With Large TEM Horn and PGC Output .............................................. 21
Figure 6. Cross-Section Drawing of HS With Point Geometry Converter, Brewster
Angle Window, and Extended-Ground-Plane Antenna ........................... 21
Figure 7. HS Output Section With the Point Geometry Converter Feeding an
Extended-Ground-Plane Antenna Through a Brewster Angle Window ... 22
Figure 8. Phoenix Radiated Pulse at 8.5 Meters ................................................... 23
Figure 9. Phoenix Radiated Spectral Content ....................................................... 23
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Figure 10. Jolt Hyperband HPM Source................................................................. 24
Figure 11. Jolt Radiated Electric Field Waveform at 85 Meters ............................. 24
Figure 12. FLAPS Antenna With a Cross-Shorted Dipole Array ............................. 26
Figure 13. Mode Converter Vlasov Antenna and Vlasov Antenna Attached to a
Coaxial MILO ....................................................................................... 27
Tables
Table 1. Dielectric Properties of Some HPM Plastics ............................................... 3
Table 2. Relative Spark Breakdown Strength of Gases ........................................... S
Table 3. Cathode Study Findings ................. ......................................................... 11
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Pulsed High-Power Microwave Source Technology
Summary
This paper provides an overview of the major types of high-power microwave
(HPM) sources and the critical technologies required to build them. Pulsed
HPM technology has been of scientific and military interest for several decades.
Originally, the interest focused on the area of high-altitude electromagnetic
pulse (HEMP) concerns.
HEMP is produced when a nuclear weapon is detonated high above the earth's
surface, creating gamma radiation that interacts with the atmosphere to
create an intense electromagnetic (EM) energy field that is harmless to people
as it radiates outward but can overload computer circuitry with effects similar
to, but causing damage more swiftly than, a lightning strike. HEMP effects
became fully known in 1962, when a high-altitude nuclear test (codenamed
"Starfish Prime") over the Pacific Ocean disrupted radio stations and
electronic equipment 800 miles away in Hawaii. The HEMP effect can span
thousands of miles, depending on the altitude, design, and power of the
nuclear burst. It is speculated that a single device detonated at high altitude
over the central United States could affect the entire country, since the HEMP
would be picked up by conductors, such as wires and power cables, acting as
antennas to conduct the electrical energy into various electronic systems. This
EM radiation was found to have field levels on the order of several hundreds of
kilovolts per meter with onset or rise times of a few nanoseconds and a
duration of nearly a microsecond. Fields of these magnitudes were found to
have severe detrimental effects on numerous electrical systems and items,
such as the power grid, automobiles, communications equipment, and aircraft.
Much testing was done in the 1960s and 1970s to determine vulnerabilities
and to find mitigation solutions. The HEMP is essentially a wideband
microwave pulse, and several EMP simulators were devised and built for use in
testing its effect on various electronic systems. In addition, several programs
were established to investigate the possibility of generating and radiating
other spectrums of EM radiation that may have some of these same effects
without requiring a nuclear detonation. This was the impetus for the
advancement of pulsed HPM technologies for weapons.
HPM radiation is composed of shorter waveforms at higher frequencies than is
HEMP, which makes it highly effective against electronic equipment and more
difficult to harden against. Whereas HEMP weapons are large in scale and
require a nuclear capability along with technology to launch high-altitude
missiles, HPM weapons are smaller in scale, involve a much lower level of
technology, and are within the capability of almost any state. HPMs can
damage computers and electronics similar to the way HEMP can, although the
effects are limited to a much shorter range. Technical accessibility, lower cost,
and the vulnerability of U.S. electronic equipment could make small-scale HPM
weapons attractive to terrorist groups. HPM devices are now categorized as
directed-energy weapons.
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One major use of HPM by the military is for electronic attack, or what is
referred to by the media as an "ebomb." HPM sources developed for this
purpose provide peak powers in excess of 10 gigawatts. The goal of such a
weapon is to disable communications and computer systems prior to any troop
movements and render the enemy unable to stage a response. The technology
used to drive such sources has its roots in pulsed power, and for narrowband
sources requires the use of tools that have been developed in the plasma
physics community. Reliance on microprocessors that have an increasing
density of circuits packaged onto each chip makes such systems ever-more
vulnerable to HPM effects. As an example of the possible effects of HPM
weapons, on 28 May 2001, a U.S. Commanche helicopter, flying in New York
state while performing tests involving HPM weapons, was reported to have
generated a low-level energy pulse that disrupted the Global Positioning
System devices used to land commercial aircraft in Albany.
The use of this type of weapon can be based on several scenarios, depending
on the asset it will be used against. Sometimes, it may only be necessary to
upset a data bus transfer to produce a success; other times, success may not
be so simple. Some of the kill mechanisms obtained from microwave weapons
include semiconductor overheating or burnout, arc generation, computer
upsets, voltage induction into sensitive circuits, display upset, and overvoltage
in discrete components. The asset to be neutralized will often determine the
specific type of microwave source to be used; for example, assets with slots
designed for communications purposes may be most vulnerable to narrowband
HPM of a specific frequency, while assets with several computers linked by a
communications bus may be more vulnerable to ultrawideband (UWB) pulses
of a specific pulse repetition rate (PRR). Often, the variety of EM radiation that
would be most effective is not obvious, and therefore several must be
evaluated.
If EM radiation is able to penetrate a target, the issue then becomes the
susceptibility of the many semiconductor devices, which make up the various
circuits of the target. Failures in semiconductors owing to thermal effects
occur when junction temperatures are raised above 600° Kelvin. Since thermal
energy diffuses through the semiconductor, failure mechanisms depend on the
microwave pulse duration. If the pulse duration is short compared with
thermal diffusion times, then the temperature increases in proportion to the
deposited energy. Pulse durations (t) shorter than about 100 nanoseconds fall
into this regime, and the threshold power for damage varies as 1/t.
Experimental testing has shown that for pulse durations between 100
nanoseconds and 10 microseconds, the power required for damage scales as
1/t1 12 • And for pulses longer than 10 microseconds, a steady state in which the
thermal diffusion rate equals the rate of energy deposition and temperature is
proportional to power, resulting in a constant power requirement for damage.
In this case, the power requirement scales as t. The consequence of these
scaling factors is that short pulses require very high power but little energy,
while very long pulses require large amounts of energy but little power. This
analysis results in a vast range of HPM sources capable of damaging
semiconductor devices. The above applies to single-shot pulse durations, but if
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a PRR is applied such that there is insufficient time for thermal diffusion
between pulses (about 1 millisecond), then there will be an overall constant
rise in temperature. For this reason, the PRR capability is of extreme
importance for any HPM source.
As a matter of course, assets to be tested include those of friend and foe alike,
the goal being to find vulnerabilities in both and correcting those found in our
own assets. Several techniques are employed to mitigate vulnerabilities found
in assets, including filtering of conductor lines, using metallic enclosures,
eliminating any unnecessary openings in the outer enclosure, and using ferrite
or other magnetic materials. Any electronics inside a completely sealed
metallic container (Faraday cage) would have no vulnerability to HPM of any
variety; however, such a scenario is also of little or no use, since there could
be no communication to or from the enclosure. Assets therefore must include
some openings for communications, instruments, air flow, and sensors,
sometimes as a matter of fulfilling their function.
From the HPM source perspective, care must be taken to prevent fratricide and
harm to friendly assets. To prevent fratricide, all connections to the source
must be filtered to prevent fast transients from returning to the control unit.
Some signals can be transmitted using fiber-optic cable; however, there is
usually a piece of equipment at the source end that must be filtered. Some
connections, such as the high-voltage power supplies, can make good use of
high inductance filtering to eliminate fast transients, while others, such as
trigger lines, must make use of other filtering means, such as transformer
coupling, lightning arrestors, transorbs, and fast-acting, high-voltage diodes.
Preventing harm to friendly assets is difficult and is a major reason why HPM
has rarely been employed in actual battlefield settings. To ensure there is no
harm to friendly assets, all assets would have to be tested for vulnerabilities,
something that is not done at present. The antenna is a major factor in this
matter. Unfocused antennas radiate a pattern that spreads as it progresses
outward and, thus, the area subjected to the EM fields increases with distance.
It is then harder to separate one's own assets from the radiated fields.
In addition, it is very difficult to detect these sort of pulsed sources, since the
pulses are very short (typically 1-500 nanoseconds), and even in burst mode,
the bursts are usually less than 10 seconds. The short burst mode operation is
necessary because of the high peak powers and subsequent heating of key
components such as switches. The UWB sources would be the most difficult to
detect, since they have nearly zero energy at any one frequency and so would
not be detected at all by instruments such as spectrum analyzers.
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Critical Technologies
Several technology areas are critical to the design and fabrication of a working HPM
source. First, because the pulsed-power section of the source must operate at high
voltages, it must contain insulating materials capable of withstanding the required
voltage. The insulatin g scheme chosen is critical to the success of the project;
therefore, several insulation techniques will be discussed, along with the merits and
drawbacks of each. Another pulsed-power technology that is critical to the success of
any source is high -voltage switching; various types of switches will be discussed, along
with applications. Finally, cathode materials are a technology area that has been
thoroughly researched and is critical to narrowband HPM generation; several cathode
materials will be discussed, along with needs for future cathodes.
INSULATION
Electrical insulating materials or dielectrics are essential not only for pulsed power and
HPM generation but for the proper functioning of all electrical and electronic equipment.
In fact, usually the size and operating limitations of a piece of equipment are
determined by the choice of insulating material. In the past, all manner of varnishes,
tars, petroleum asphalts, natural resins, gums, saps, and minerals were used for
electrical insulation. Now there is an almost endless list of possible insulating materials.
The question now is, which material is the most appropriate for the task at hand? In
pulsed power, and even more so in HPM applications, the choice is critical. All
properties of a material must be weighed against one another to make the proper
choice. Such properties as voltage breakdown, dielectric loss, dielectric constant, cure
temperatures, hardness, tensile strength, flow modulus, and the variation of all these
with frequency, voltage, and temperature must be considered before an appropriate
insulating material can be selected. Many of these properties have never been
published for most materials, and even when they have been published, they are
typically known only at one or two frequencies. Design ing insulation for challenging
applications is at best a compromise between evils. Most of the material studies are
carried out for the power industry, making them valid only at 50 or 60 hertz.
Measurements at these low frequencies usually provide little or no clue about the
values at much higher frequencies. Therefore, it is often up to diligent engineers to
obtain materials data on their own.
One recent research area of interest is in developin g what are termed artificial
dielectrics in an effort to decrease insulation weight. This material is made by
suspending hollow glass microspheres in a lightweight dielectric medium. Depending on
the concentration of these spheres, t he dielectric constant can be lowered and tailored
for the application, and the loss tangent of the media can also be reduced . Coating the
spheres with a conductor such as aluminum can also raise the dielectric constant. Thus
far, as might be expected, the dielectric strength of such materials is much lower than
that of many thermoplastics, but they have been useful for applications such as
radomes.
Insulation generally falls into one of three categories: (1) homogeneous insulation,
where the entire insulating volume is filled with the same media, be it solid, liquid, or
gas; (2) lam inated insulation, where the insulating volume is filled with some manner of
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layering of different materials; and (3) insulation by other means, such as magnetic
insulation-these are usually used only where special conditions apply.
UNIFORM HOMOGENEOUS
Uniform homogeneous insulation implies that the insulating material is consistent
throughout the volume. However, in some cases, such as that of epoxies, there is a
uniform loading of some other material, usually to increase some desired characteristic
of the final product. Examples are loading with silica to increase dielectric strength and
loading with glass fibers to increase mechanical strength. The loaded material is
typically of such small dimensions that it has only a very small effect on other material
parameters from the truly homogeneous case. The use of uniform homogeneous
insulation also results in a more easily modeled design.
SOLID
Solid insulation is often the easiest and typically the most desirable form of insulation
since it does not require maintaining or replacing a liquid level or containing or
monitoring pressure. This fact is often critical to a source project if maintenance or long
shelf lives are important factors.
Plastics
The true title for this section should be "Thermoplastic Polymers (Plastics)," as they
comprise one of the largest groups of insulating materials used in pulsed power and
HPM generation. The term "plastics" includes acetals, acryl ics, amides, imides
polyarylate, polybutylene, polycarbonate, polypropylene, styrene, and sulfone
polymers. Plastics were first used as insulation in the 1930s, and it is hard to conceive
of constructing a high-voltage pulse source without them. Plastic materials have been
tailored to suit a wide variety of applications. In the early 1980s, plastics manufacturers
soliciting Sandia National Labs stated that they could engineer plastics to meet any set
of material properties desired. It later became apparent that this was not the case and
that, as usually occurs in nature, when one parameter was made more desirable, others
were made less desirable. In spite of this fact, some well-eng ineered plastics are now
available for some very demanding applications, such as switch housings and
transmission lines. Nevertheless, virtually no new plastics are being introduced today.
For the past 20 years, engineers have worked with essentially the same plastic
materials, although some improvements have been made in the quality of resins and
extruding and casting methods. In spite of this, there is still much more variation in
specifications (especially mechanical specifications, such as tensile strength) for plastics
from batch to batch than there is for metals. For this reason, the most demanding
plastics applications where the limits of some specification will be approached require
purchasing and independently testing a specific batch to assure confidence. One
interesting and well-documented phenomenon associated with plastics is the
nonlinearity of electrical breakdown strength with thickness. In very thin layers, some
plastics display extremely high breakdown strength. For instance, polypropylene in half
mil (1 mil = 1/1000 inch) layers yields 7,000-volts-per-mil breakdown strength, while
in one-eighth-inch thickness, this figure drops off to 900 volts per mil. One theory to
explain this is that the proximity of imperfections in the material across the thickness
reduces the dielectric strength in thicker samples. This fact can be used to advantage
by layering thin sheets of insulation together to form thicker insulating regions (see
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section on laminated insulation). Many plastics come in a wide variety of shapes, forms,
and grades, including bulk volumes, a variety of sheet thicknesses, and various rod
diameters. The subject of using plastics as insulation fills volumes in reference books
and has yet to be exhausted . Table 1 shows selected dielectric properties, collected
over several years, on some of the most common plastics for high-voltage use.
Table 1. Dielectric Properties of Some HPM Plastics
Material
Acetal
Polypropylene
Polyetherim ide
Polysulfone
Polyethersulfone
Polycarbonate
Polvohenylene Ether
Polyphenylene Sulfide
Polyethylene
Polyvinylch loride
Trade Name
Delrin
Ultem
Ultrason S
Ultrason E
Lexan
Noryl
Ryton
Breakdown Voltage
(kV /mil)
4.0
6.0
7.0
7.5
5.8
6 .3
0.6
0.4
5.0
1.8
Epoxies
One of the greatest advantages of casting epoxies is that a high dielectric strength can
be attained with low maintenance, a long shelf life, and ease of transportation
compared with liquid or laminated insulation schemes. Some of the best epoxies ever
used for high-voltage insulation have only recently become available. These
advancements are due mainly to efforts by the automotive industry to miniaturize the
ignition coil to the point where a separate coil could be incorporated into the spark plug
cap at each cylinder. Technologies have been devised for casting several varieties of
epoxy to allow larger volume castings. The goals are to minimize voids and bubbles,
deal with any exothermal effects, and reduce shrinkage. In addition, a good candidate
material for high-voltage casting must have a high dielectric strength at the frequencies
required, a long pot life, good adhesion, and an unlimited cure depth at a low
temperature. With many epoxies, shrinkage and the glass transition point are functions
of the cure temperature. New, state-of-the-art epoxies have several desirable
characteristics never before available in a sing le product that make them ideal for high
voltage applications. Two such characteristics are a low viscosity at room temperature
and a long pot life. This means the epoxy can be mixed (resin and hardener) and the
unit to be insulated can be filled under vacuum to eliminate voids and bubbles. Some of
these epoxies have the viscosity of milk at about 100 degrees Fahrenheit and a pot life
of several hours. A third desirable characteristic is a very low, almost imperceptible
exotherm. Th is allows insulation of items sensitive to heat, such as thin plastics, paper,
and electronic components or integrated circuits . A fourth desirable characteristic is low
shrinkage, even in large castings. This allows insulation of regions where dimensional
stability is important, such as at distances from high-voltage sections and resonant
structures. A fifth desirable characteristic is good adhesion, both to itself and to
components to be insulated. This is important because any separation from a
component creates a void region where the dielectric strength will be compromised.
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Adhesion to itself allows casting in several stages without fear of voids or mechanically
weakened areas. A final desirable characteristic-one that is of obvious importance-is
a very high dielectric strength. With attention to detail and diligence in the casting
procedures, dielectric strengths of more then 4 kV/mil on 0.125- inch thickness have
been achieved. All these advantages have allowed operation of high-voltage pulse
systems at increased power levels and at half the volume of those previously insulated
with mineral oil.
Urethanes and Silicones
These materials are used for casting solid high -voltage equipment, as well as for
coating components to reduce the effects of shrinkage or shock. Typically these
materials are very hard to use with vacuum casting techniques and, thus, have a much
lower dielectric strength than do the best epoxies, especially in larger volumes. Another
drawback is that many urethanes and silicones require either moisture or volatile
ingredients in the curing process, both of which cause problems with high-voltage
systems. Nonetheless, a wide variety of these materials are used in the fabrication of
high-voltage pulse systems for applications that require their characteristics.
LIQUIDS
Liquid insulation has been the primary type of insulation for high-voltage systems since
the beginning of the field . Over the years, mineral oils, vegetable oils, hydrocarbons,
and even tars and saps have been used as insulation. Dielectric liquids have long
served as electrical insulation in power transformers, capacitors, cables, and switching
equipment. Several once commonly used fluids are no longer available because of their
toxicity and environmental impact. As a result, liquids for insulation that do not have
these problems have now been developed for certain applications, including mineral
oils, silicon oils, fluoropolymers, and high-molecular-weight paraffin oils. Most of the
dielectric fluids made are tailored to the power industry, which accounts for about 99
percent of the demand for these liquids. As a result, many such liquids contain additives
that, while necessary for the power industry, are detrimental to high-voltage
applications. These include low-vapor-pressure additives for controlling viscosity and
antioxidants for improved aging. In addition, most insulating liquids also contain
moisture and dissolved gases, which are only weakly bound to the liquid molecules and
are easily freed when high electric field stresses are present. Scientists have for years
worked to extend the usefulness of transformer oils, fuorinert, and castor oil. They have
also developed corona-processing equipment for improving the high-voltage
characteristics of insulating oils. This has allowed state-of-the art insulation design
using insulating oils and oil-impregnated systems. The corona processing involves
flowing the liquid insulation media through a high-field -stress region while under
vacuum to remove dissolved gases and low-vapor-pressure constituents from the oil.
The liquid is then filtered to remove particles larger than 5 microns. This process
improves the corona initiation voltage limit for the liquid and greatly extends the life of
components insulated with the media. It has also allowed a significant reduction in the
size and, thus, energy density of pulsed transformer systems.
GASEOUS
Insulating gases are used in many high-voltage applications where weight is a primary
issue. Typically the use of gases as an insulating media requires pressurization and,
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thus, implies heightened safety concerns. Even low-volume vessels can contain
hundreds of joules of energy in the compressed gas, and a housing failure can hurl
fragments at deadly velocities. Highly compressed gases are used only in cases where
some prized benefit is worth the increased cost and design trials to be exacted. One
example of this is extremely fast switching where the electrode spacing is proportional
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- LLE-UAP-PR001 — Unresolved UAP Report, Colorado, 2023
- LLE-UAP-PR002 — Unresolved UAP Report, Colorado, October 2023
- DOW-UAP-PR133 — Unresolved UAP Report, Middle East, 2025
- DOW-UAP-PR135 — Unresolved UAP Report, Middle East, 2025
- DOW-UAP-PR140 — Unresolved UAP Report, Middle East, 2022
Same agency: DoW
- DOW-UAP-D094 — Analysis of Flying Object Incidents in the United States, 1949
- DOW-UAP-D097 — Project Sign Progress Report, 1948
- DOW-UAP-D084 — US Army-Flying-Saucer-Study 1949
- DOW-UAP-D155 — Air Intelligence Information Report, Saudi Arabia, 1957
- DOW-UAP-D176 — Triangular UAP AARO Memorandum for Record, 2026
- DOW-UAP-D177 — Unresolved UAP Report, Catalina Island, 1955