CIA-UAP-003 — The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

File: CIA-UAP-003
Agency: CIA
Incident date: 1954-1974
Released in: Release 03 (2026-06-12)
File type: PDF

This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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TL;DR

406 pages later, still no memo on the UFOs.

PDF, CIA, covering 1954-1974 reconnaissance programs
Chronicles U-2/OXCART development, ops, Powers downing, includes UFO index entries, 406 pages
No official conclusion in the file

AI summary

A declassified CIA document titled "CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974" is a historical account of the U-2 and OXCART programs, covering their development, operations, and intelligence collection activities from 1954 to 1974. The document includes details about U-2 overflights and mentions of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) in the index. It also describes operations over regions such as Cuba, China, and Vietnam during the same period. The text spans 406 pages and provides an overview of the programs' roles in overhead reconnaissance.

Full text

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♦ Chapter 1

Searching for a System

The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4
The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17
The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19
The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21
British Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23
The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24
The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27
A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32
CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33

♦ Chapter 2

Developing the U-2

The Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39
Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43
Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45
The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48
Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56
Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59
The CIA - Air Force Partnership .............................................................. 60
Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61
Delivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66
Initial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68
U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72

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Hiring U-2 Pilots ........_................................................................................. 73
Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75
Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76
Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79
Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80
Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82
The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84
AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88
The U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89

♦ Chapter 3

U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958

The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94
The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95
President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96
First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100
First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104
Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109
The End of the Bomber Gap................................. :................................ 111
Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112
Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122
Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128
The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133
Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135
The Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139
Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142
Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143
Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147
More Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149
Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152
British Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153
The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 ........................................... 157

♦ Chapter 4

The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960

The U-2 and the "Missile-Gap" Debate................................................ 159
The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170
The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177
The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181
The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183
Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187

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..'t', Chapter 5

U-2 Operations After M ay 1960
U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca ................ ...................... ................... .. 197
U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. ..... ............ .............. ....... 197
Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ........................... ........ ....... .. 198
U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199
U-2s Over South America ............. ..................................................... 211
U-2 Operations in Asia ........ ........................... ......................................... 211
Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ............... .... ..... 211
China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ................................ ..... ..... 215
U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216
U-2Cs for Detachment C....................... .................... ... ....................... 217
U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219
End of Detachment C Operations ...................................... ............... 219
Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221
New Detachment on Taiwan ......... ......... ........................................... 222
Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ............................ ....... 230
U-2s in India ................. ........................................................................ 231
Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233
Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237
Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238
.............................. ......... 240

~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~
=-=-=~
The End of U-2 Overflights o
ain an China ............................. 242
Peripheral M issions by Detachment H ................... .......................... 244
Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246
Improvements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247
Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ... ... ............. 247
Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249
A New Version of the U-2 ...................................................... ........... 251
Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs............. ........ .......... 253
The Final Years of the U-2 ................. ................................................ .... 253
Support to Ot her Agencies .... .......... .................................................. 254
Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255
The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257

Chapter 6
The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968
The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .... ................ 260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270
Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274
The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277

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New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's Hig h Speed ............. 279
Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................ ....... .. ... .... 281
Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283
Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART.............................. ......... 283
Delivery of t he First OXCART ............................................ .................... 286
Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286
OXCART' s First Flights.............. ... .............................. .... ..... .......... .. ......... 288
Speed-Related Problems .... .. ........................................ ........... .... ............. 290
New Versions of the OXCART ............................ ............ ..... .................. 291
The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292
Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295
Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297
First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304
The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307
Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312
Summary of t he OXCART Program ...................................................... 313

♦ Chapter 7

Conclusion
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315
Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319
U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319
Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320
Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321
Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. ....... 321

♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325

♦ Appendix

B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327

♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried

by the U-2 ........................... 335

♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337

4 July 1954-1 May 1960
♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .................... .......... 339
♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347
♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355

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is Unclassified.

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ieeret NOFGftN

FOREWORD

This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita
tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program.
which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary
aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the
program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi
cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program,
along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the
CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and
permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and
Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais
sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in
this study.
The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the
CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART
projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted
problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an
enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July
1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence
on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed
for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program ·
managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover
age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions
over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt
ful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only
reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down
Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower
forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency
must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the
diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em
ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond
overhead reconnaissance programs.
Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is
the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA
records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The
authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and
have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in
formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned

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Secret NOFORN
reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does
reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno-
logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national
policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable
reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.
Many people made important contributions to the production of
this volume. In the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript,
Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon-
strated her high talent as a copy editor, and provided
staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to
more members than we can name from the Publications, Design, and
Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic
Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the
call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly
work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this
handsome volume.
Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W.
Pedlow, who completed it, brought complementary strengths to this
work. A veteran of CIA service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began
research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff
on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and
Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter-
viewing, he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning
to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member
of the DCI History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns
Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence
officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow
undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized,
edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be-
come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly
benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history
of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program.
J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff
April 1992
Secret

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Secret l\10FeAN

PREFACE
When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947,
no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a
major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose
would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military
services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and
flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime.
By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and
growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its
satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had
been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration
overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost
and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important
areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais
sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct
deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers
feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could
lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non
military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be
manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the
greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance
program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air
Force provided vital support.
The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted
20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the
U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining
Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA
developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad
vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was
canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air
craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71.
Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in
formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to
the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA
U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years

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later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President
Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of
aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l
(strategic reconnaissance) versions.
The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject
of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B.
Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers'
memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many
more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael
Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and
National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac
curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to
classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable
amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the
public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of
the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's
overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions
on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers
more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the
OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air
craft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been
officially declassified and released.
After the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance
projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the
United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the
U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the
U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac
cess to classified documents by interviewing many former
participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also
quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller
on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(l 983).
There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and
OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and
Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by

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Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret
Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a
wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects
but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without
examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af
fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is
impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and
ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.
In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro
gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government
documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air
Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the
Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor
tant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in
overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen
tation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there
are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual
reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the
Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence
Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower
Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.
Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received
from many individuals who played important roles in the events they
recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance of Agency records management
officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance
program is also greatly appreciated.
To ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in over
head reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors
have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some
aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those
involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to
be described in very general terms. The omission of such information
is not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency's recon
naissance aircraft. ♦

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Chapter 1

Searching for a System

THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE
For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or
structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall
trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob
se_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better
view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it
became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi
tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance
proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von
Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: '·'The
nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next
1
war."
By World War II, lenses, films , and cameras had undergone many
improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster
than the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use
photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be
fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing
afteiwarcl
Peacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first in
cluded only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental high
ways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to
using photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II,
when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communi
cation between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.

' Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16.

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6cc. ct P.OFORN

Chapter 1
2

By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had
been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Sov iet
military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi
ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities
bomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap
ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air
defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory
policies, was also largely an unknown factor.
Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed
the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet
Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone,
telegraph, and radio-telephone-mo re secure, thereby greatly reduc
ing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu
rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively
blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents
using covert means to communicate intell igence, travelers to and
from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re
port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth
ods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence
tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other
methods were available.

Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance
Although at the end of World War II the Un ited States had captured
large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet
Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source
of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was
interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To
obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence
community established several programs to debrief German scientists
who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but
were now being allowed to leave.~

: A t the end of World War II. th<! Bri tish had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor.
mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and
the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical
information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather
intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab
sorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<!
gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit
individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had
worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the
Returnee Exploitation Group ( REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of
s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[
)
he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service
Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff.. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).

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Sec, et NOF=ORI\J

Chapter 1
3

Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in
formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer.
As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying
to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force
effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of
the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and
electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking
by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com
pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also
lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the
air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of
any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights
(called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along
the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even
managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in
Siberia.

Text continues in the original file (406 pages).

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