NASA-UAP-D020 — Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part II, 1965
File NASA-UAP-D020 is a declassified pdf from NASA, recording an incident dated August 30 - September 2, 1965 at Cape Kennedy, Florida, published in Release 03 (2026-06-12). This page carries the original file, its official summary and its full text.
- File
- NASA-UAP-D020
- Agency
- NASA
- Incident date
- August 30 - September 2, 1965
- Location
- Cape Kennedy, Florida
- Released in
- Release 03 (2026-06-12)
- File type
Topics: Apollo & NASA crews
This document is a preliminary transcript (Part II) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 5 flight crew technical debriefing. NASA conducted this debriefing between August 30, 1965, and September 2, 1965, at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida. Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper and Charles “Pete” Conrad described observing debris and “snow” and “all sorts of glittering pieces of this, that and the other thing” in the “Visual Sightings” section of the document (pages 157-220).
Open original file · WAR.GOV page
TL;DR
Turns out the ‘strange vehicle’ only needed a frequent-flier discount.
- NASA Gemini 5 debrief, Aug 30-Sep 2 1965, Cape Kennedy crew quarters.
- Crew described debris, glittering pieces, floating washer, aurora-like glow, and a vehicle tracked 20 orbits.
- No official conclusion in the file.
AI summary
A classified NASA technical debriefing transcript from 1965 details the Gemini 5 mission, focusing on spacecraft systems, visual sightings, and training. It includes discussions between astronauts Conrad and Cooper on platform alignment, thruster issues, control system operations, and spacecraft stability. The document describes challenges with thruster degradation, attitude control, and malfunctions, including hydrogen venting and power-down procedures. It also mentions an observed strange vehicle tracked for 20 orbits, noted for unusual movement and a flashing light, with photographs and 16-mm film taken. Other sections cover spacecraft control issues, yaw instability, temperature, humidity, oxygen systems, communication problems, and equipment malfunctions. The report includes crew observations of debris, a floating washer, celestial objects, and an aurora-like phenomenon. No explicit mention of UFOs or UAPs is made, except for a brief reference to an unidentified event on the sixth day at 01:02:15.
Full text
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Authority:
NW 91526
GEMINI V
Technical Debriefing
Part ~I_I__________________
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NOTICE: This document may be exempt from
public disclosure under the Freedom of Infor
mation Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Requests for its re
lease to persons outside the U. S. Government
should be handled under the provisions of
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THIS MA TE ,-IAL CO NTA I NS INF09'MATION AFl"£ CT IN G
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U NITED STATES
W ITHI N THE MEANING OF TH£ ESPIONAGE LAWS . .
TITLE 18. U .S.C. SECTION 793 AN D n• . THE T9'AN S
MISS IO N OR REVELATION OF WH ICH IN "N Y M"NNIEl'I
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COt~FIDEt~TIAL
PRELIMINARY
GT- 5 FLIGHT CREW DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPT
PART II
Prepared By
Spacecraft Operations Branch
Flight Crew Support Division
September 2, 1965
This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S . C.
Section 793 and 794, the transmission or revela
tion of which in any manner to an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
Group 4:
Downgrade at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
co~~FIDEt'4TIAL
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('
PREFACE
This preliminary transcript was made from voice tape recordings
of the GT- 5 flight crew debriefing conducted August 30, 1965 thru
September 2, 1965 at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida .
Although all the material contained in this transcript has been
edited , the urgent need for the preliminary transcript by mission
analysis personnel precluded a thorough editorial review prior to its
publication.
Errors in this transcript will be corrected as soon as
possible and an official transcript will be published at a later date .
This document contai ns a transcript of the second part of the
total debriefing.
A prel iminary transcript of the first part was
publi shed on September 1, 1965 , and it contains the crew' s description
of the mission from an operati onal standpoint.
Page 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph Page number
8.0SYSTEMS OPERATION
8.1 Platform 1
8.2 OAMS 16
8.3 RCS 47
8.4 Environmental Control System ..
8.5 Communications
8.6 ElectricalSystem 80
8.7 Computer ... 82
8.8 Crew Station 90
9.0 OPERATIONAL CHECKS
9.1 Apollo Landmark Identification ... 132
9.2 Cabin Lighting Survey .•. 146
9.3 SPADATS Tracking Check 147
9.4 UHF Antenna Pattern Test 147
9.5 Thruster Illumination Checks .. 148
9.6 Dual Command Transmitter Test 148
9.7 Radar Tests 148
9.8 HF Evaluation 150
10.0 VISUAL SIGHTINGS
l0.1 Powered Flight 152
10.2 Orbital Flight • • 153
10.3 Reentry 172
11.0 EXPERIMENTS
ll.l Visual Definition of Celestial Objects (D-l),
Nearby Object Photography (D-2), and Terrestrial
Features (D-6) 210
11.2 Celestial, Space and Terrestrial Radiometry 222
11.3 Synoptic Terrain(s-5) and Weather (s-6)
Photography 228
11.4 Visual Acuity and Astronaut Visibility (S-8/D-13)
and Vision Test (M-9) .. 233
11.5 Electrostatic Charge (MSC-l) .... 242
11.6 Zodiacal Light Photography (s-l) •••• 243
11.7 In-flight Exerciser (M-3) ... 243
11.8 In-flight Phonocardiogram(M-4) 244
11.9 Cardiovascular Reflex Conditioning (M-l) 244
1l.lo Cloud Top Spectrometer (S-7) 246
1l.ll Miscellaneous 248
FIDENTIAL
Page 5
TAT
12.0 PREMISSION PLANNING
12.1 Mission Plan (Trajectory) ...255
12.2 Flight Plan .... ....255
12.3 Spacecraft Changes ...255
12.4 Mission Rules ... ....256
12.5 Experiments ..256
12.6 Training Activities .257
13.0MISSION CONTROL
13.1 GO/NO GO
13.2 PLA and CLA Updates .…..…..261
13.3 Consumables ........ .......261
13.4 Flight Plan Changes ..…..264
13.5 Systems ..... ……..267
13.6 Experiments Real-Time Updates .268
14.0 TRAINING
14.1 Gemini Mission Simulator ...270
14.2 LTV, DCPS ..284
14.3 MAC Engineering Simulator ....285
14.4 Centrifuge .…..286
14.5 Translation and Docking Trainer .. ....286
14.6 Planetarium ..... .288
14.7 Systems Briefings ...... ..292
14.8 Flight Experiments .... .293
14.9 Spacecraft Systems Tests ... .294
14.10 Egress Training ..296
14.1l Parachute Training ..297
14.12 Launch simulation .298
14.13 Network Simulation .298
14.14 Reentry Simulation .298
14.15 Simulated Network Simulations
14.16 Zero "G" Flights ...... .….299
14.17 Flight Plan Training ... ...300
15.O CONCLUDING COMMENTS
15.1 Crew Quarters 302
15.2 Physical Training and Aircraft Flying ... 303
15.3 Sea Lab 304
15.4 Watchesand Clocks 304
15.5 Miscellaneous Discrepencies 306
15.6 Medical Aspects 310
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1
8.O
SYSTEMS OPERATIONS
8.1 Platform
Cooper
By day we used standard procedure of finding a
zero yaw, which is a little easier to do down at
about retro position.
The nose is a little bit
in the way for determining zero yaw unless you
pitch down just a little past nose low in zero
zero- zero position.
When pitched down just a tiny
bit, zero yaw was very readily apparent to within
a fairly reasonable degree of accuracy, and then
ease it right on up .
We had lines for the zero
zero position to give us our pitch and roll on the
horizon.
This was the regular day alinement.
Night was pretty much the same except we 1 d get
zero yaw by a star, get roll and pitch by the zero
lines on the window (or knowing where they were
approximately) line this with the top of the air
glow or the horizon.
At that point you'd go into
Cage, hold it there at that position until it
caged) then uncage the platform to BEF or SEF
whichever the case might be, and then to to Plat
form and Attitude on the FDM and FDI's.
Then
aline the platform fine aline SEF or BEF by keeping
,
Page 7
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the needles zeroed.
It would slowly gyro torque
itself and correct out the small errors for fine
alinement.
Conrad
Anything to add, Pete?
Well, I didn ' t hear all of that, but I think the
alinement is straightforward.
One thlng I had not
read in either the GT- 3 or GT- 4 debriefings on
this subject on out the window alinement was that
we have a window gage that you can us1i t hat will
put you right on in roll and pitch ancl, of course,
for yaw you still have to use the same out the
window reference.
Cooper
One thing that I think that should very definitely
training wise be readily available anc. we looked
and looked and looked and couldn't fir..d any was an
actual scale picture of the left hand wi ndow and
the right hand window with what the hcri zon should
look like at zero-zero-zero and at retro attitude
and at minus 90 degrees left and 90 degrees r ight
and at 60 degrees left and 60 degrees r ight and
this type thing .
I've never seen an a~tual drawing
showing the horizon line on a window a·'ld what i t
should look l ike .
Page 8
3
Conrad
Yes
Cooper
I think this would be a tremendous benefit and
shouldn't be difficult to come up with.
Conrad
If you place your eye so that it goes through the
lower left corner of the right window or the lower
right corner of the left window and run that eye
position right through the front RCS yaw thruster,
the lower yaw thruster in the front ring, I guess
that's ring A, anyway, you take a line between
your eye, the corner of the window and the front
RCS yaw thruster, right through the middle of it,
and put that line on the top of the airglow or the
horizon.
Then the spacecraft, and this looks like
an excessively nose up attitude, but it's not,
you're zero degrees in pitch then the window frame
is just about vertical to the horizon and it forms
a perpendicular angle.
Cooper
The inside edge of the frame .
Conrad
The inside up and down edge of the window corner
makes a perpendicular angle to the horizon and you
can use that as a roll gage.
If you set it up
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4
that way that platform isn ' t off 4 or 5 degrees
i n roll or pitch.
Cooper
So, i t r eally looks like, when you fir3t start
lining it up, it appear s to you that f ::-om the
left seat that you ' re actually rolled l eft ,
Conrad
Yes, that's right .
Cooper
And f r om your seat it would look l i ke j t was
actuall y r olled right .
Cooper
It doesn ' t look horizontal at al l, but that ' s due
to the fact t ha t you 're sitting off by thi s offset .
Conrad
One other thing that you might say about platform
alinement is that if you ' re not on in roll and
pi tch, mainl y roll, t his really will ea t you up
in alinement time .
Cooper
Roll and yaw are t he bad errors creator:, .
Pitch
you can be off a l ot i n and it' 11 corr ec:t r ight
out.
Conrad
Not if the other two (roll and yaw) are off .
Cooper
But if you 're off in roll and/or yaw th€n it
really takes a long time and its real rcugh .
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5
Conrad
You don't want to be deceived by the fact that
the needles are holding in the center pretty well.
Cooper
That's right, one thing that we found when we
were going through this real, real long platform
alinement prior to getting all l i ned up for retro
fire was that we had the needles all alined, t hey
were sitting all glued out .
But you have to s i t
there with them for a little b i t glued out .
They
sit there all zeroed out, it looks like everything
was all alined and al l of a sudden yaw begin to
ease off quite a bit showing that we weren ' t
alined.
Conrad
At one time we went to Orbit Rate when we had not
pulled the yaw all the way in and, boy, it showed
up in r oll as we started moving around.
Cooper
Orbit Rate and Horizon Scan.
Conrad
I mean it shwed up in the roll axis .
Cooper
Oh, yes.
Conrad
You have to take t he time and be careful with the
Right .
platform alinement, no doubt about i t.
° CSf*fDEt◄ TIAl
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6
Cooper
And i t takes t ime to do it and do a r ~ally good
job on it .
Modes .
The only thing I can say about Cage is
that it takes an excessively long tim1; to Cage .
Conrad
I ' ll comment on this even though we d:i. dn't get a
chance to do the rendezvous , but even in simula
tion, it was apparent and the l i ttl e bit t hat
we did in flight caging the ~latform, getting
ready for alinements and t hings l ike -;hat, it
was very time consuming .
I think tha ·; you could
find use for a f ast slave cycle .
Cooper
Very much so.
Conrad
Fast Cage cycle is what I should say.
I 'll say
it's a luxury item but it sure could be helpful .
Cooper
SEF and BEF worked j ust like advertisEid .
SEF
for fine aline and small- end- forward, BEF for
reYersing your phase angles so that you ' re still
steering to and fine alining blunt encl forward .
Conrad
J i m and Ed made the comment that t hey never alined
BEF, that t hey a lways alined SEF.
We alined SEF
normally through the flight and when ,:e were ready
60 ►◄~ ~
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7
to retro, we wanted to save as much fuel as
possible, so we alined BEF and I think alining
BEF is easier than in SEF.
Cooper
Yes ,
Conrad
I think you can tell yaw better going backwards
than you can going forward.
Cooper
Yes.
Conrad
I don't know why, maybe it was just psychological .
Cooper
I agree with you, I really think you're right.
I think you can tell it better.
It streams away
from you a little more .
Conrad
Yes.
It was easier to pull in in yaw .
I thought
it was a little more comfortable feeling .
I
enjoyed the riding around alining the platform
BEF much more than when we alined it SEF, and I
felt we were closer to being on most of the time
when we pulled it in in yaw.
Cooper
Of course, we had a little better control system
there, it does help.
Conrad
Yes .
Mt ◄ FIDE►~TIAL •
Page 13
~NftDE~~TIAt·,_
8
Cooper
I think either way (SEF, BEF) is good, both worked
very a dequately and it just depends on which way
you want to aline for what you ' re going to do .
BEF is certainl y a t least as acceptable as SEF.
ORBIT RATE was not bad off a t all .
We di dn't
have any l arge errors in it due to t he f a ct that
we had more nearly circulari zed our oroit from
t he burns that we did .
Conrad
We were about at 171- 60 at that time p<=:riod .
I
don't know what t hey ha d picked as an orbit rate
number at the end fina lly for the REP .
Cooper
We were about 107, 166 .
Conrad
Yes .
I was really surprised with how ,..,ell the
platform stayed on after just t a king a quick look
at zero- zero- zero, not even trying to ali ne these.
We j u st passed freely through this in dr ifting
flight and uncaged the platform right into Or bit
Rate, and it didn't get off five or ten degrees
in any of the three axis .
Cooper
For about 20 hours .
'i0 ►~FIDE►~TIAL
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G©t◄ FIDl!~~TIAL
Conrad
9
Yes, for about 20 hours that we drifted around .
It was finally off the most in roll.
It got about
15 degrees off in roll .
Cooper
Orbit Rate worked very well .
Conrad
Other than inertial work, I just didn't see any
big advantage in free.
You'd still think in
terms of the local horizon up there most of the
time.
Cooper
Yes .
Conrad
We just never had much occasion during the f light
to use FREE.
Cooper
Platform displays .
Conrad
Bal l oper ation through the poles was just
fantastic!
It was so smooth.
The only way you
could tell that you were going through a pole
is you could see the roll index, vehicle is on the
,,
roll gimbal, flip .
Cooper
Yes.
This is something we had trouble finding
out, whether this was the case or not and we
deliberately ran several specific checks of this.
<!rJ~~FIDEt~TIAL
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Regardless of which way you approachec. it from,
whether you approached i t fast or slm.- or whether
you 're going through the 90 or 270 pojnt on the
ball, you can go right smack through the middle
of it, you can sit right in the middle of it,
you can move up or down, r ight or left and the
ball doesn 't jump, doesn't j itter, doesn't do
anything .
It's just beautiful .
Conrad
Yes .
Cooper
We did a burn right through each one of the poles .
I think the controls are pretty simila-r to what
they are in the s imulator .
There are t wo
exceptions, one of which I think i s valid and
which I think may be influenced by the fact that
we had a lot of s low degredation in ou:~ OAMS
system.
I thought that the PlJISE system in the
spacecraft had a lot less torque, a reasonable
amount less torque and it got a lot leBs, as we
went along it got less and less and leHs .
Conrad
Yes .
Cooper
But even i nitially, it felt like thP- PlLSE system
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11
had less authority in the spacecraft than it does
in t he simulator.
On the other hand, I felt the
RATE COMMAND system had a heck of a lot more
authority in the spacecraft than it does in the
simulator .
Cooper
That RATE COMMAND just flat snaps you in.
In the
simulator, when you come around in RATE COMMAND
and you let off it will go through 5 to 10 degrees.
You have to let off on it 5 to 10 degrees early.
By golly, in the spacecraft you didn't have to
let off even a degree early.
When you let go,
it stopped right there jus t like you put on the
brakes.
Conrad
Yeah.
Cooper
It was so tight that you almost had to - -
Conrad
That was OAMS Rate Command.
Cooper
You almost had the feeling that the OAMS Rate
It was good and it was tight .
Command was almost bending the Adapter Section .
I t had such high torquing rate .
Conrad
On day 2 and 3, our OAMS system was working
completely correct.
I was extremely impressed
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•
12
with how nice a control system i t was.
We made
several maneuvers using this control Eystem and
didn 't have any gripes on that sys tem at all .
As
Gordo said we were really impressed wjth the
Rate Command system.
FCSD REP
When you turned around 90 degr ees in crder to get
rid of the REP, did you use the 8-ball ?
Cooper
Yes .
Conrad
FDI 's are on this Gimbal flip bus i ness too, you
see .
They do that in the trainer, but they were
steady as a rock in the spacecraft .
Cooper
Yes, we used the FDI's for t he fi ne al ine .
Al
though to get there we used the 8- ball .
Conrad
We had trained to use the IVI ' s .
FCSD REP
That 's right.
Cooper
We used the IVI ' s , not t he FDI' s .
We used t he
I VI ' s as the real fine measure of being l i ned up .
We used the FDI 's too .
Conrad
You can use anything in the spacecraft.
Page 18
•
Cooper
13
You can't use the FDI 's or the 8- ball as a
reference in the mission simulation because you
have this gimbal flip which just gives you fits .
..
We didn't use Ra te Command very much, mainly just
for the burns .
In fact, t he burns are the onl y
times we used Rate Command.
I used the Dir ect
system several times and I thought the Direct was
really good.
It was good and crisp and you had
good authority with it.
Conrad
I had the impression that the spacecraft was a
lot more stable vehicle in Di rect than it was in
the simulator .
Cooper
Tm t' s right .
Conrad
In t he simulator you tend to sit there and go
too much and go too much .
When Gordo'd stick a
shot of Direct in to go someplace, it never
showed up in another axis .
An equal shot i n the
other direction would stop it r i ght now .
Cooper
Yes.
Conrad
The effects momentum of the spacecraft didn ' t seem
to be as great in flight as they were i n the
~f:HDEt◄TIA ~
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"t OMFtDE~ ◄ TIAL
14
simulator.
Cooper
You didn ' t have to lead a :, much.
That's right .
The Direct system was a much more precise system
in the spacecraft than it i s in the s ' mulator .
Conrad
I thought it was quite easy to fly, but there's
no doubt about it, boy, that Rate Corrunand eats
up the fuel .
Page 20
•
Cooper
Direct uses quite a bit of fuel also.
Conrad
We did use a little fuel t hat one day.
15
We were
doing so many experiments in a row that we had to
very rapidly get the spacecraft back to a zero
zero- zero or a pitch down 30 posi tion.
When you
track one of these targets and come through the
nadir and keep on going, boy, you're really smoking
towards a rearward direction.
Cooper
You're sitti ng i nverted BEF.
Conrad
That's r i ght, you ' ve got rates built up going away
from you and you ' d have to use Direct to stop those
rates, get yourself moved all the way back up here
and s top them again.
Maybe it'd be so tight that
you'd use Di rect to get down and start on it, and
then switch to Pulse and track in Pul se and then
r i ght back up and start doing something else.
Well,
we di d eat up a lot of fuel that day, but we got
everything done that day.
We hit darned near all
targets.
Cooper
Di rect i s a real responsive , real fine way to
maneuver.
60t~Fl0Et.t:tAt
Page 21
16
•i Q:M f~Cf1stI IAla
Cooper
..
Platform controls were very straight fc,rward.
I
thought they all functioned as expected.
Conrad
The Platform took the full 25 minutes to go through
the fast heat, and the first time on it was really
cold and took another 3 minutes worth before start
of the Cage Cycle.
After that, it seemed to stick
right around 25 minutes to get the platform up and
on the line and start into Cage .
Cooper
Right now, I've got extreme confidence in that
Platform.
Conrad
I really think it does well.
'.Ihe platform did an outstanding job during the
entire flight.
Cooper
I t sure did.
8. 2 OAMS
Cooper
We fired the OAMS on the pad and it was mushy.
couldn't hear them fire just gas mainly,
You
About
the third round of firings however, you could really
feel them fire off, they were all good.
Cooper
During flight the OAMS started out very good and in
about the third day began to degrade.
~:he f i fth day
Page 22
~ l i U iiAL
17
i s when we found the two thrusters that were not
operating correctly.
Conr ad
'Ille number 8 thruster was working real good when we
found that the number 7 thruster was out.
So we
shut the sys tem down again and had a big talk with
Houston about this .
We went one more revolution
and they gave us some tests to perform on 7 and
that 's when we di scovered 8 wasn ' t working.
Conrad
'lwo of them quit , within an orbit of one another.
Cooper
We had already run complete tests on it and
number 8 had been working on the previous tests and
quit on the next one.
'Ille story of the old OAMS
inflight system was that gradually as the days went
by there was more , and more that went wrong with
it unti l f i nally at the end we had less than half
the thrusters left and they were pretty bad.
Conrad
I realized a couple of heater blankets were probably
out on the OAMS system, but I'm still convinced
unt i l somebody convi nces me otherwise, that the
thing that shot the OAMS system down, was the
decision to turn off the OAMS heater.
I had ques
ioned the decision in the air to only point that
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18
I could.
I didn 't think we were in that much
trouble for electrical power.
I still think it
was a mi stake be cause I think even with a couple
of blankets out, if we'd have kept the ,3ystem warm
wi th the rest of the heaters, we'd have never froze
them up.
Cooper
'llie thrusters themselves were actually ·vorki ng
because you could actually get a glow off of them.
There was a little bi t of fuel or oxidiier coming
out of it and burning , but it wasn't getting the
proper amount of mi xture ratio.
Conrad
Now, they could have been dirty.
That :ould be it,
but it was purely in the valves i n the thrusters
themselves because they were putting out thrust
even at the end.
I f you wanted to hold it i n full
D:Lrect wi th 7 and 8 circuit breaker e ngs.ged , you
were getting wet f uel thrust.
Cooper
Yes .
You were getti ng a little wet thr~st.
Conrad
let's go into how the whole thing occurred.
We
had shut the heat er down a long time ago and we
really hadn't agreed wi th that, but there wasn't
much we could do about it.
We were i n the mi ddle
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19
of doing experiments on the fifth day, and we had
had a little trouble alining the platform.
What
was happening, apparently was the number 7 thruster
was getting cranky, but we also knew we were vent
ing hydrogen and we knew this because we were
getting some torqueing out of that .
At the t i me
Gordo was having trouble ali ning the Platform, we
thought it was because the hydrogen was venting.
Finally Gardo said, "There's something wrong with t
the control systems. "
Once we deci ded there was
something wrong wi th the control system, that ' s
when it went just like back i n the simulator.
We
shut everything down, went to Direct, thought about
it for a second and turned off all the circuit
breakers , turned them all back on one at a time ,
tested all of the thrusters and, sure enough , when
we got to number 7, it was out, completely out.
Conrad
So then I tri ed secondary ACME bias power.
We
tried the seconday yaw and the secondary attitude
drivers with no effect so we were relatively as
sured that something had happened in either the
hand controller or the fuel was not feeding.
We
decided to power down r i ght there , which we did ,
and we advised flight of what the problem was .
£ 8.M&HW~Jl~i
I
Page 25
20
think that's about the time we really decided the
s canner wasn' t a ny good , or had we already tol d
them about that?
Cooper
Yes.
We 'd already t old them about that.
Conrad
Yes , you ' re right.
I know what it was .
That's
when we discovered that the voice tape was out.
We were right i n the middle of s everal experiments
and it occurred
approximate l y like 16:30: 54 on
the f i f th day.
We r eported to Houston that the
voice tape was out, the number 7 yaw L~ft thruster
was out and that I had turned the OAMS heater back
on.
I was suspicious of that all the ·;ime .
That's
when they called up a nd gave us this m:i.nimum power
down.
Why did we go i nto that?
They had us power
down everything.
Cooper
At about the same time that we came up with this,
they came up with this idea that the hrdrogen was
boiling off s o fast that we were going t o be out of
hydrogen by about the end of the f i fth day at the
rat e we were goi ng i f we d i dn't power down and stop
the usage of i t .
.iO~~FIDEMTfffl:
•
Page 26
21
Conrad
Yes.
That's when we came around on the next
revolution.
'Illey had us fire up everything again
to take a look at i t and that's when we found out
number 8 had just gone down the tubes too.
But
number 8 was still givi ng us something; number 8
was stil l burning, but it was burning off mi xture.
You could see a flame .
Cooper
You could see a glow out of it.
Conrad
You couldn ' t hear it like you could hear the other
thrusters, but you could see lights on the ni ght
side so you knew something was coming out.
'Ille
drivers j ust weren't openi ng all the way or some
thing.
FCSD REP
The fifth day at 16:30 is the first problem you
had with the OAMS, is that right?
Conrad
No, earlier.
When we first powered the system
up, we were having trouble with that very f irst
platform alining and we felt we were having some
hydrogen venting problems.
'Ihat's when we drifted
way off, and Gordo said, "'Ille Pulse system isn't
going to hack this hydrogen venting. "
He went
t o Di rect and blipped the yaw l eft thrusters .
•
Page 27
22
All kinds of garbage came by the spacecraft.
It
looked like we blew a whole bunch of junk out of it.
I remember distinctly seeing gold balls .
Cooper
Great b i g balls of l iquid.
Conrad
So it must have been raw fue l .
Something at this
time wasn 't working right , but I guess number 8
was putting out full thrust and number 7 was still
work i ng but not all the way.
Now mayb<? right then
and there if we'd have really worked that system
over; fired all the thrusters in Direc1; and a
couple of good healthy loads throug it ,., and put
the h eater s back on the line, we might have sal
vaged thew
vaged the whole system. It must have been right
at the point of freezing up.
Cooper
This was early i n the fifth day.
.£:Obi:EIOEttllAL
Page 28
23
Conrad
We didn't hit the direct thrusters long enough to
heat them I don't think.
I do distinctly remember
saying to Gordo "We blew all this junk out of there . "
Conrad
We ' d never seen anything like that before and we'd
been up there 5 days and seen all sorts of things .
We could see liquid oxygen when we vented it, if we
vented i t under the right light conditions .
We
could see when we vented hydrogen under the right
lighting conditions.
It would all float by the
spacecraft and at low sun angles, either at sunup
or sundown any one of these quantities, ECS o ,
2
CRYO o2, or RSF hydrogen, you could see it come
whistling by the spacecraft.
We were continually
floating around in these old silver balls of either
hydrogen or oxygen.
Cooper
Okay, well that was pretty well the background of
what happened.
Some thrusters that had checked
out good would subsequently check out bad or be
completely inoperative as the days went by.
So
finally we wound up with maybe half of the total
OAMS thrusters still operating properly.
Page 29
24
•
Conrad
We had some thrust remaining in every axis but yaw
l eft .
We had some in yaw left if you just wanted
to dump raw fuel overboard .
I don ' t know whether
it was fuel or oxidizer.
Cooper
Generally, what we'd do is roll and pitch to get
our yaw left .
Conrad
I f we were tumbling and wanted to damp we just
waited until we translated into the right axis in
whi ch we had some authority .
Cooper
The one axis that always seemed to work pretty good
so far as control authority was pitch.
Conrad
Yes
Cooper
Pitch up and pitch down seemed to work reasonably
well all the time.
Conrad
Yes .
I wonder i f that had something to do with the
pitch thruster lines on the manifold being close
to the source.
Pitch was always good .
Our trouble
was mainly coupling in the yaw thrusters both right
and left.
Cooper
Source pressure was easy to monitor .
SJurce temper
ature we could monitor and it was too CJld .
Page 30
25
Conrad
It ran down in the 48 degree area .
Cooper
It showed that it was running too cold .
That's why
we questioned turning the OAMS heater off ,
Cooper
Regul ated pressure was fine .
Conrad
Right on the money .
Cooper
Propellant quantity seemed to read r easonably good
until it got down towards the end.
At that point
(from about 10 percent on down) the propellant
quantity just went on down to the bottom of the
scale .
It was reading below zero and yet ground
readouts indicated OAMS propellant quantity remaining .
Cooper
Monitoring of OAMS propellant r emaining onboard
information was fairly good .
Conrad
Yes.
I thought we were fairly close.
Cooper
Gr ound i nformation agreed fairly good with onboard
information in general .
Conrad
The whole OAMS sy stems got to be reviewed .
I
think that they think we wasted a lot of fuel and
I think that on day 3 we probabl y were a little
overgenerous with our fuel usage.
ret◄ FtE>Et.~TIA ~
I
But I ' m still
Page 31
COt--1 FID Et◄ :r IA~
26
,;
convinced that because we went so long with the
OAMS heater off that we were not burning a nominal
fuel to oxidizer ratio.
Cooper
Yes .
Even though we were in a
rush to get a lot of
...
these things done, I was still extremelr conscious
of fuel usage .
Although I'd used Direct to get
i t started, I wouldn't just fire all the way around
in Direct input, let it coast around, a~d then stop
it right there.
Conrad
Yes.
I never saw fuel usage in the sim1lator like
we saw in flight .
Cooper
I t just seemed to go down very rapidly on the gauge
during that one period of time.
Conr ad
And yet we went night after night all night long in
Horizon Scan or in Pulse and would hardly use any
fuel at all .
As a matter of fact, the ground gave
me the figures.
Thi s was when we were ::unning all
ni ght long in Horizon Scan so that we had a nice
reference .
a night.
11
They said "You' re using about 2 pounds
Now, that seems like a r easonable amount
for what we were doing.
•
Page 32
27
Cooper
We were using it for Attitude Hold and for getting
pictures and to get through the day side .
Conrad
Oh Yes.
We never used Rate Command except for the
maneuver burns.
Cooper
We were tracking the missile using Diredt.
Had to
get on it in a rush so I went to Direct .
Conrad
I questioned propellant quantity prior to lift- off.
It was 87 percent at lift- off,
I thought we were
Previous: NASA-UAP-D019 — Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part I, 1965 · Next: NASA-UAP-D021 — Gemini 7 Technical Debriefing, 1965
Same topic: title & summary match
- NASA-UAP-D019 — Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part I, 1965
- NASA-UAP-D021 — Gemini 7 Technical Debriefing, 1965
- NASA-UAP-D017 — Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing, Part II, 1965
- NASA-UAP-D016 — Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing, Part I, 1965
- NASA-UAP-D018 — Gemini 4 Experiment Debriefing, 1967
- NASA-UAP-D022 — Gemini 9 Debriefing, 1966
Same period: 1965
Same release: Release 03
- CIA-UAP-017 — Placement on High Alert Due to Perceived Aggressive Foreign Posturing
- DOW-UAP-D084 — US Army-Flying-Saucer-Study 1949
- FBI-UAP-D002 — FD-1057, Unresolved UAP Report, Colorado Springs, 2022
- FBI-UAP-D003 — Digital Rendering, Unresolved UAP Report, Colorado Springs, 2022
- FBI-UAP-D009 — FD-302-67, “Northeastern Orb Sighting,” 2026
- FBI-UAP-D010 — FD-302-71, “Northeastern Orb Sighting,” 2026