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NASA-UAP-D016 — Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing, Part I, 1965

File NASA-UAP-D016 is a declassified pdf from NASA, recording an incident dated 6/9/65 at North Atlantic Ocean, published in Release 03 (2026-06-12). This page carries the original file, its official summary and its full text.

File
NASA-UAP-D016
Agency
NASA
Incident date
6/9/65
Location
North Atlantic Ocean
Released in
Release 03 (2026-06-12)
File type
PDF

Topics: Apollo & NASA crews

This document is a preliminary transcript (Part I) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 4 flight crew debriefing taken aboard the recovery ship, USS Wasp, on June 9, 1965. Astronaut Ed White recounts seeing “sparkles” during the flight.

Open original file · WAR.GOV page

TL;DR

Those “sparkles” were probably just the ship’s disco night mode.

  • Pdf, Gemini 4 crew debriefing, USS Wasp, June 9 1965, North Atlantic
  • Ed White mentions observing “sparkles” while orbiting
  • No official conclusion in the file

AI summary

A declassified NASA document titled NASA-UAP-D016, a preliminary Gemini 4 crew debriefing, was conducted on June 9, 1965. The transcript covers various aspects of the mission including insertion, communications, and comfort during the countdown phase. Crew members discuss issues with suit fogging, communication confusion, and radio volume problems. Throughout the document, astronauts McDivitt and White describe technical challenges, environmental control system issues, vibrations, noise, and visual observations during training and flight. On pages 79–88, the text references UFOs and describes space operations, including an unidentified object near Hawaii and difficulties in visual tracking. Other sections detail spacecraft separation, velocity adjustments, booster tumbling, and unusual rotational motion. On pages 295–305, astronauts report observing a glowing, stable object during reentry, describing orange and green flames and spacecraft stability. The document concludes with discussions of reentry, retrofire, parachute deployment, and landing.

Full text

Page 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority:

82

NW 91526

CLASSIF!CAT:ON CHANGE

I

o_ _ __
38

By authority of--~4,...L.11.1-...___.~~L--L-....t.-e=---1

hanged by U~1:i:.~1 LDate

1973

42,
/0 0

/ /4-

PRELIMINARY
GT- 4 FLIGHT CREW DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPI'
PART I

Prepared By
Spacecraft Operat ions Branch
Flight Crew Support Division
June 16 , 1965

This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the Espionage Laws , Title 18 . U. S . C
Section 793 and 794 , the transmission or revel a ­
tion of which in any manner to an unaut horized
person is prohi bi ted by law .

f

I

Group 4:

Downgr ade at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

NOTICE: This document may be exempt from
public disclosure under the Freedom of lnfor•
rnation Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Requests for Its ra•
lec1~e to persons outside the U. S. Government
should be handled under the provisions of
NASA Polley Cir-ecti11e 1382.2,

Page 3

COI\JFIDENTIAt

PREFACE
This preliminary transcript was made from voice tape recordings
of the GT-4 flight crew debriefing conducted aboard the recovery ship,
the USS Wasp , on June 9, 1965 .
Although all the material contained in this transcript has been
edited, the urgent need for the preliminary transcript by mission
analysis personnel precluded a thorough editorial review prior to its
publication.

Errors in this transcript will be corrected as soon as

possible and an official transcript will be published at a later date.
This document contains a transcript of the first part of the
debriefing, during which the crew described the mission generally
from an operational viewpoint .

A preliminary transcript of the re­

mainder of the debriefing will be published by June 23, 1965.

It

will cover systems operations, operational checks, visual sightings,
experiments , pre-mission planning, mission control, and training.

Page 5

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph Page Number
1.0 COUNTDOWN
1.1 Crew Insertion..
1.2 Communications..
1.3 Crew Participation and Countdown 6
1.4 Comfort..... ..7
1.5 Environmental Control System ...
1.6 Sounds .....
1.7 Vibrations ..13
1.8 Visual 13
1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays 15
2.0 POWERED FLIGHT
2.1 Lift-Off Cues ....17
2.2 Roll Program . . . . . 19
2.3 Pitch Program ...…..19
2.4 Aerodynamics . ..…..20
2.5 Environmental Control System ...... .....20
2.6 Maximum g .... ...21
2.7 Windshear ..21
2.8 DCS Update
2.9 Engine l Operation ..22
2.10 Engine 2 Status ..23
2.11 Acceleration g's ..23
2.12 BECO ..24
2.13 Staging ..25
2.14 Engine 2 Ignition ..25
2.15 RGS Initiate -..26
2.16 GO/NO GO ... ....28
2.17 Systems Status ....28
2.18 Acceleration
- 2.19 SECO..
2.20 Steering .
3.0 INSERTION
4 3.1 Post-SECO
34
3.2 SECO + 20 Seconds 35
3.3 Insertion Activities 38
4.0 ORBITAL FLIGHT
4.1 Station-Keeping .50
4.2 Extravehicular Activities .87
CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7

CONFIDENTIAL
- 4.3 Other Orbital Operations ..186
4.4 Preretro Preparations ..250
5.0 RETROFIRE
5.1 36 Events ..259
5.2 22 Events ..260
5.3 13 Events ..260
5.4 12 Events ..261
5.5 Events .. ....265
5.6 Events ...270
5.7 Events ...273
5.8 Retropack Jettison .. ....280
5.9 Communications 281
6.0 REENTRY
6.1 Reentry Parameter Update ...282
6.2 400 K ..282
6.3 0.4 g.. ...284
6.4 Acceleration Profile .290
6.5 Spacecraft Control .296
6.6 100 000 Feet .... .....296
6.7 50 000 Feet ... ..299
6.8 Main Chute Deployment ..302
6.9 Communications .... . ….303
6.10 Single-Point Release ...305
6.11 Postmain Checklist Items 306 .
7.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY
7.1 Impact ..310
7.2 Checklists ..313
7.3 Communications .…314
7.4 Systems Configuration ..316
7.5 Spacecraft Status .320
7.6 Post-Landing Activities 325
7.7 Comfort . ... 325
7.8 Recovery Force Personnel . 326
7.9 Egress ...
7.10 Survival Gear
7.11 Crew Pickup .328
CONFIDENTIAL

Page 9

CO ►~FIDE►~TIAb.

1.0 COUNTDOWN
1.1 Crew Insertion
White

The only problem during insertion was that I
fogged up again in my suit before we got the fans
on.

I think I'm just going to always fog up in

that suit of mine.

We turned the fans on quick,

but with the visors closed it doesn't go out.
McDivitt

We did have a problem with crew insertion on the
Wet Mock and I think we had that probably pretty
well taken care of.

They put us on the suit

loops and didn't turn the fans on.

Normally you

wait for a clearance from the 1:t>acecraft Test
Conductor before you throw any switches. Well,
after we almost "died" of carbon dioxide poison­
ing during this +,est~ we got this
clarified.

matter

As soon as we got in the spacecraft

and one of us was on the suit loop, we would go
ahead and cut the switches on to put us on two

White

fans.

We did this during insertion in the Wet

Mock.

It really went well.

We really went for a long time in Wet Mock.

I

was beginning to wonder if I was going to have to
open my visor.

I was really uncomfortable.

COt74 FIDEt~TIAsb-

Page 10

2

McDivitt

But everything worked out okay on this one .

White

Yes.

McDivitt

The timing was excellent , I thought .

I didn't

think we had any prob l em at all .
White

No.

I don ' t believe they missed a stroke on the

insertion.
1 . 2 Communications
White

I think the communications were pretty well
worked out, Jim?

McDivitt

Right .

One thing, the last three minutes or four

minutes, we got a little confused about who was
talking to who .

I was getting the Spacecraft

Test CJnductor , the Booster Test CJnductor and
the CAP COM at the same time .
White

We got a split count , too, on lif't--off.

McDivitt

The f irst three or four minutes I was hearing the
B)os ter Tast C?nductor .

I heard what was going

on on his loop , and I was listening to him get
checks in f r om all of the guys .

I really wasn ' t

getting a clue a s to what was going on .

I was

supposed to be getting the booster clues from the
test conductor .

I was supposed to find out when

the engines were going to gimbal and when they

-€9·NFl9E~TIA;t

Page 11

COl>J~IDENIIA~

3

were going to open the prevalves and stuff.
wasn't getting it from him .

I

We were getting a

lot of other information that made a lot of sense
to the Booster Test C :>nductor, but not an awful
lot to us .

There were cal l - outs l ikeVSequence

05003 complete." Well, thi s just didn' t mean any­
thing to us .

On top of this we had the Spacecraft

~es t Conductor calling out the times , and super­
imposed on all of this was Al Shephard , the Cape
CAP COM , calling out events that he was reading
off that went on at certain specified times .

He

called out','Stage 1 prevalves Vand we could hear the
fue l gushing downstairs and the whole booster
rumbling.

He called out ','Stage 2 prevalves','and

you could hear the same thing all over again.

I

thought t hat was a lot more meaningful than the
test conductor comments.
White

I think that was wrong, the way they were doing it .
I think we weren't supposed to be on any loop
except CAP COM at that time .

McDivitt

Well, I think what happened was that we got this
thing over-coordinated.

Al was going to give us

all this information, but then as a result of
GT-3, (Gus and Jolm said they didn ' t get enough

-t:ON FI0 Er\JTl~L

Page 12

r<3 e I<i Flt Et>I TI Rt

4

information about the boosters) they put this in­
formation on the test conductor ' s loop too .
ha.d too many guys talking .

We

I think if just CAP

COM talked from thr ee minutes on down we would
be all right .
White

This is the way I thought it was going to happen,
and then from three minutes on down it really got
busy with the yak , yak, yak of everybody talking .

McDivitt

I don't lmow whether we got off the Booster ~st
C)nductor's loop or not, but at final countdown ,
2 minutes , 1 1/2, 1, 30 , 20 , 10 , 9 ,

Al gave me

8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 , 1 .

I got a similar count

from the Spacecraft Test C~nductor but it turned
01 ·. t that they were a second out of sequence on
the countdown and Al was giving me 10 and our
Spacecraft Test Conductor was giving me 9.
went ten- nine , nine - eight, eight - seven .
were at the same t ime .

So it

They

All I knew was that we

were getting close to engine ignition and then it
started .

So , we got a little over-communicated

there .

I think t hey kept us adequately informed

on the hold .

As a matter of fact , I ' d say we got

over- informed there at the end .

We had too many

guys keeping us informed and I t hink the pendulum

<Ol<:JFIDel'4TIAl

Page 13

5

swung from the GT-3 flight where nobody got in­
formed of anything over to our flight where we
got i nformed by three different people about the
same event .
White

On our flight, too, we were really more
aware of t he problem than those people were.

We

could sit right here and see the gantry come
down and stop, that was r eally the only problem
they had in the whole count .
McDivitt

I don't think radio discipline is a problem, Each
guy was disciplined on his own channel .

They were

conducting their tests on their own channel .

But

we were lis tening to three different communica­
tors at the same time.
one .

We should have had only

I think probably what we will need to do is

to get to about T-3, and then just cut in the

CAP COM.
White

That was the way it wa.s planned to be, I thought .
That's the way Al planned it.

McDivitt

That's correct.

I think, because there had been

some lack of information on GT-3, that it some­
how had been written into the SEDR so that we
were also on the Booster Test Conductor 's MOPS,
so that we were also getting his countdown.

COrq--pf0f:Nfl1tt

I

Page 14

6

think CAP COM, 'alone, would have been sufficient .
One further comment , I had to turn my ·11HF volume
all the way up to hear anybody .

I was at max .

There we were sitting right on the pad , talking
to a gu:y two miles away, and there I was with the
volume full up .

It didn ' t give me much confi ­

dence as to reception I was going to get when I
was 200 miles away , or three or four or five
hundred miles away .

I thought that the volume

control on the radio was inadequate.
White

We were wondering what we were going to have when
we got up a hundred miles .

McDi vitt

That's right.

At max volume we didn't have enough

and at minimum volume it didn't shut it off.

We

will cover this later.

1.3 Crew Participation and Countdown
McDivitt

I think it was just about right .

I don' t think

we were over worked and I think we had enough to
do to keep us busy.
White

Actually, all we really made was a check of
switches .

There wasn ' t really too much else .

Having the back-up crew run that midcount was the
the right solution.

I wouldn't have wanted to

participate in anymore of t he countdown than I

-COt<JFtDEt'4flJ<l

Page 15

€O ► 4FIDE ► ~TI/>,~

7

did.
McDivitt

That's an excellent point.

The flight crew's

participation should be the final count, not the
midcount and precount.

It doesn't tire the prime

crew out doing a lot of chores that they don't
really have to do.

I think this is a good pro­

cedure.
1.4 Comfor t

White

Initially, the first 20 or 30 minutes, I was
squirming around and I felt a little uncomfor­
table.

But after I had been in for 30 or 40

minutes I didn't feel there was a real restric­
tion on staying for several more hours.

I would

have been very disappointed if they had said,
"Well you have been in there long enough and we
will work on this gantry and try it again tomor­
row."

I would have been happy to stay there

several more hours while they fixed the gantry
instead of pulling me out.
After an hour and 40 minutes,which is the end of
the normal countdown,I didn't feel uncomfortable.
We sat in the simulator and were a lot more un­
comfortable than this.
table.

I didn't feel uncomfor­

I had a chance to take a couple of little

CO ► 4FIDE~~TIA~

Page 16

COl'IFIDE~4TIAt

8

McDivitt

naps .

I noticed Jim was napping too .

Yes .

I concur with F.d, although I don't want

to get carried overboard.

We shouldn't scrub

due to crew fatigue .
White

I think it is up to the crew.

If the crew is un­

comfortable they should come down.

But I don't

think he should say, "Okay, two hours and 30

minutes .

You cut this off. ", because it is an

operational procedure.
McDivitt

When I first got assigned to the crew I always
fe l t one of the toughest things to do would be
laying back for an hour and 40 minutes or so
prior to launch .

The time we spent in the simu­

lator laying on our back, I thought to be a very
uncomfortable position.

As we went through all

the training and testing at McDonald , and again
at the Cape ,

;ny back got more callouses on it.

I got used to laying with my feet over my head .
At launch time I wasn't a bit tired from laying
on my back .
White

This is brought out in one of our last simulations ,
where we ran the whole four hour simulation and
we forgot to have them tilt us up to 30 degrees.
We just got used to running that way,

COl"I P"te E~~Tl,\l

Page 17

€Otr4FIDEttftAl
McDivi tt

9

That ' s right, I just don't think we should
scrub the flight because of fatigue.I don ' t think we
should do that.

White

We weren ' t approaching this point.

We had a long way to go.

1 . 5 Environmental Control System
McDivitt

I think we ought to get this water management
panel squared away and everybody figure out what
we are supposed to do with those switches.

I

don ' t think we should be arguing about where the
switches are supposed to be on the launch pad.

If

I hadn't asked somebody where the waste manage­
ment switches should be we would have probably
launched with it in · EVAPORATOR.

I knew that

i t wasn't supposed to be in the evaporator .

At

one of the ten thousand briefings we got on it, we
were told it shouldn't be there .

We ought to get·

this kind of stuff squared away before launch day.
Thirty minutes before lift-off we were arguing
about where that switch was supposed to be.
White

I wasn't confident that they knew where they
wanted that switch to be.

McDivitt

Well, I didn ' t think we should have it in the eva­
porator.

So, I think that water panel could have

cost as much as a wee~s slip on our launch because

coNFIDENTIAt-

Page 18

10

€01'1FIE>Et<ITtAt
they didn't know where to put those valves and
it's only got three valves on it .
made much simpli er than it is .

It ought to be

I think they

should get that squared away before the next
flight.

F,d and

I knew where we wanted it.

We

wanted it off and the other two switches in
NORMAL and leave it alone .
with .
White

That's what we flew

That's the way it ough t to be fixed .

We can get canned , though, for not flying with it
in the right position by the checklist .
didn't say that on the checklist

It

Every check

list we got was different .
McDivitt

That ' s right! Fach one was different .

Fi nally

we decided we were going to do it as w.e did and
left it thr ough out the whol e flight .
thing worked fine .

We had ECS briefings by a

mul titude of peoples from MAC
guys who designed it.
agreed ,

Evel;'y­

including the

Everyone of them dis­

It probably started out to be one of the

simplest things in the whole spacecraft .

By the

time they got t hrough confus ing us with it, I
got the feeling nobody knew what was s_i,,.pposed to
happen to it .

I consider this the most danger­

ous of all.

'€ 0 l<I F' IE> Et-q ftAt

Page 19

11

White

I was convinced of that, too, after the mix-up
in putting all the water in the lithium hydroxide
tan.ks.

McDivitt

There would have been about a 30 minute four-day
mission.

McDivitt

The people that built the thing don't know how
it is supposed to go .

They had better decide

this and let us know.

I felt that George Roe at

the Cape knew what was going on except the Cape
personnel got the valves in the wrong position and
almost lost the lithium hydroxide canister full
of water with no water in the tanks.

I ' m not

pointing a finger at George Roe • I think he' ·s
pret.ty knowledgeable about the system.. Maybe
somebody just wasn't following directions.

But

somebody ought to find out about the water
management system and make it clear to everybody
how it is supposed to be operated.
1.6

Sounds
McDivitt

You can hear the prevalve~ both first and second
s tages.

The prevalves and the fluid gushing are

very loud noises comparable to the engine gim-baling. I wasn't really aware that they were
going to be that loud.

C-0t~FIDf~qflAb

~

Page 20

'COI\IFIDE~◄ llAl

12

White

I got that feeling when I read Gus and John ' s
debriefing .

McDivitt

Did you?

I didn't .

I got the impression that it

was going to be a much quieter noise .
White

McDivitt

Well, the whole noise level of the engine girnbal­
ing

was louder than I thought it was going to

be.

It surprised me .

Yes . Engine gimbaling was much louder than I
heard before .

We heard this during Wet Mock and

during precount and at midcount.

You can hear

those engines gimbal around; they really shake t he
spacecraft .

But, I really wasn't prepared for

the big noise that the prevalves make, and such
a long noise as that fuel gushed down to the
bottom.

I guess that was what it was.

I didn't like t he sounds and vibrations we got
when they raised and

lowered the gantry.

White

It shook the whole spacecraft .

McDivitt

It shook the whole spacecraft--did you notice how
it never came up straight?

The spacecraft was

supposed to line up kind of like this and then
wham!

I had visions of them knocking us off and

laying us flat on the ground before we were
launched ,

co~,Fl0Et'4TIAI:

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cor:,-~FIDEl'~TIA I
1 , 7 Vibrations
White

Those are closely associated with the sounds.

McDivitt

Yes .

I think that the engine gimbaling makes a

tremendous vibration in the spacecraft and pre­
valves on opening and make a tremendous vibration.
The gantry going back and forth vibrated the
spacecraft.

I don ' t think there is anything else ,

do you?
White

No.

1,8 Visual

White

Well, you can sure see the gantry lower and the
whi te room disappear.

That is about all you can

see besides the sky.
McDivitt

That's pretty impressive.

That's when I sort of

got excited,when the gantry went down.

That ' s a

new realm.
White

I thought they were going to launch me.

McDivitt

You're sitting there by yourself

then, instead

of all those people milling around.
I do want to make one other comment on this visual
thing .

We did Wet Mock about one or two o'clock

in the afternoon.

The sun was shining right in

the window, almost straight down, such that the
sun came across my visor from about just at the

GOt~FIDEMTIM

Page 22

t:Ol-<IFIDEt'4T IAt

14

bridge of my nose on down .

I had a tremendous

amount of reflection inside the helmet, and I had
a great amount of difficulty seeing the instru-­
ment panel .

As a matter of fact, I'm not sure I

could have seen the instrument panel at all .
~ose first few seconds there are extremely cri­
tical on launch.

You have to be able to see those

tank pressure

We ought to keep this in

sages .

mind for those late afternoon launches .
White

That is a problem , but the g loads are so small
at this time you could a l most forget ab1ut look­
ing up .

McDivitt

Did I fly like this for

awhile during l aunch?

White

I don't think so but you could have, The g load is
so small.

McDivitt

I'm not sure whether I did or not.

White

"'his is what we had to do during Wet Mock.

We

had to put our hand up and cover the window to
look down at our instruments to see them ,
McDivitt

I 'm not sure I didn ' t launch that way .

White

I wouldn't be surprised if you did .

McDivitt

I don't think I launched that way, but as we
tilted over and we got in the sun, I think I put
my hand up for awhile .

COMftDEl'1 I IAI.

Page 23

15
White

Well, if the g's are so low that--

McDivitt

When sun gets in your face you can't see the in­
strument panels because they are just too dark .

White

The sun gets in your eyes.

The point that Jim

was making is towards a late-in-the-day launch,
which we might have later in the program , there
might be a bit of a problem of seeing the instru­
ments during launch.

Unless they put something

up, which I really don't think you want to d~ You
are just going to have to put your arms up and
shield the sun out and concent~ate on your in­
struments or you won't see them .

They are just

gone.
There is probably a point even in an early morn­
ing trajectory as you start to pitch over where
the sun will come right in your window and you
won't be able to see your instruments unless you
shield your eyes.
1,9

Crew Station Controls and Display
White

I found the switches all where they were supposed
to be and the cockpit all set up.

McDivitt

So did I, except the comment I made on the water
management system.

They didn't have the control

where it was supposed to be.

At least, they had

Page 24

16

~CNFIOEt~TIAt
it in the place where everybody was arguing about
whether or not it should be ,
White

I certainly appreciated the work the backup crew
did getting the cockpit all set up fo r us .

Every­

thing was ready to go when we stepped in.

That ' s

the way it should be.

COl<:tll10E~4TIA L

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17

2.0 POWER FLIGHT
2.1

Lift- Off Cues
McDivitt

CAP COM gave lift-off, about as good a cue as you
can get .

White

Wasn 't any question either.

Boy, you could feel

the first little motions of the booster as it
went up .

McDivitt

It was really great!

I think you could feel the acceleration at re­
lease.

There wasn't a doubt in my mind that we

were loose.
White

That 's right.

I don't know if I could feel the

bolts or hear them .
McDivitt

As a matter of fact, it seemed to steady out a
little bit.

The vibrations seemed to decrease

a little. Pretty impressive!
Not much vibration at lift-off.
White

Very low.

Very low.

I got vibrations later on , though,

didn't you?
McDivitt

Yes .
Noise.

There wasn't much noise, was there?

White

No.

There was less than I had expected.

McDivitt

Noise wasn't a cue to lift-off.

Noise was there

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18

if you were bolted down all day long.

I don't

think the noise changed a bi t at lift- off.
White

You could see the visual cues out the window .
You were watching your gages, Jim .

McDivitt

Were t here clouds out there?

White

No, but I could see it in the clear blue sky.

McDivitt

Could you?

White

Yes .

I could see the motion.

McDivitt

Okay .

Wel l, I couldn't.

White

I was looking out ,

McDivitt

I saw a little cloud go by and then I didn ' t see
any more clouds at all,

White

It was beautiful!

McDivitt

The event timer s t a rted just like it should,

Of

course , that 's the best display inside the space­
craft for lift-off.

The event timer starts , and

it did,
White

We got both clocks started with the t ime hack.
had a watch hack on lift-off and the ...
going.

I

handle

I knew when the engine ignited , within

half a second accuracy.

Three seconds later I

was waiting for the lift-off and it came right at
three seconds ,
McDivitt

We could tell ignition , too .

'€0 ► ~FIDEJ>1TJAL

We could hear the

Page 27

19
things go.
White

I agree with you.

I knew we weren ' t going to hold

it when that lift-off went.
2·. 2

Ro ll Program
McDivitt

Roll program came in at ten seconds just like it
was supposed to.

I t was smooth, and it was just

the way it was planned, on at ten seconds and went
out at twenty seconds.

Could you see it roll

out the window?
White

You can see everything out the window, I think.

McDivitt

You can probably tell by the way the sun rays are
moving, can't you?

White

Yes, by change in lighting.
a better view.

The right seat has

You have to wa tch the guages so

closely.

2. 3

McDivitt

I didn ' t even look out the window.

White

I know you didn't.

Pitch Program
McDivitt

Pitch program started just like it was supposed
to, at twenty three seconds.

Pitched over the

proper amount, the pitch needles looked like
they were hanging in there all the way.
White

You could see the booster pitch definitely, and
that was mainly due to a change in the lighting.

Page 28

co~~FIDE~~TIAt:

20

2 ,4

Aerodynamics
McDivitt

We were getting aerodynamic noise, which built up
to max q .

We got some pretty good vibrations at

max q .
White

That's where I had the most vibrations .

It was

just shaking like this .
McDivitt

It was vibrating and noisy.

White

That was the loudest noise we received the whole
flight.

McDivitt

Right after max q it got very qui et .

White

This is where I had the most vibrations .

There

were more than I expected.
McDivitt

Yes, me too. You can ' t simulate this in a simula­
tor .

You get more vibrations than you do noise .

The only thing they have in the simulator is
noise, they don't have vibrations .

It was pretty

loud and the spacecraft was actually shaking
around a lot. It was really vibrating.
White

Yes, it was .

McDivitt

The whole thing was really going at it .

More than I expected .

like a F-80 or a T-33 at a.bout
Whi te

Almost

0.8 Mach.

Very good analogy .

2. 5 Environmental Control System
White

The cabin started venting shortly after lift-off

~O~◄ FltJEf<tftAL

Page 29

21

and continued so until about 40 seconds and sta­
bilized out at 5. 5 and I made my call in.

I

think I might have called i n on RECORD .
McDivitt

You did.

White

I switched and made the final call at about 1: 10,
I realized I called on REDORD and switched over,

McDivitt

How high did it go? Did it go to 5.5?

White

5. 5 and it stayed right there .

And then I

noticed later on it progressively leaked off until

it got to 4.9 where it st ayed.

The suit? There

really isn ' t anything to say about the suit.
McDivitt

No, I

don' t have anything to say about the suit .

It oi:erated like it was supposed to .

2.6 Maximum....q
McDivitt

The noise built up gradually until we got to max
q , then it just dropped off.

White

The deterioration of the noise was almost instantaneous.

McDivitt

Very quick,

It wasn ' t instantaneous , but it was

very quick.
White

In fact, it startled me when we separated .

2 . 7 Windehea.r

McDivitt

I didn't notice anything on the rate needles that
had anything to do with the windshea.r

I couldn't

Page 30

eot~FIDE~~"f1At

22

pick out windshear • on them.

2. 8

How about you , Ed?

White

No .

McDivitt

Did you see any attitudes?

White

No .

McDivitt

No big divergences from windshea r .

DC~ Updates
White

We got both of our ros updates right on time-­
H'45

a.nd 2 : 25 ,
Ed is in charge of ros updates .

McDivitt

No comment .

White

I ' m the button pusher.

I do everything about

pushing the buttons .
McDivitt

I can do this with this little stick.

White

You can do it unless I have my knee over it .

2. 9 Engin,®. 1 Operation
McDivitt

They operated the way they were supposed to as
far as I could tell .
up fi~

on both

The tank pressures stayed
Engine 1 and Engine 2.

There

was never any doubt in my mind that they were
going to stay up there .

There weren't any of

those things like we saw in those simulations
where they came on down pretty low on the gages
when they were supposed to be at 18 or 15. There
wasn't anything like that .
up there .

€0t'1Flf7ENf 1Al

They just stayed on

Page 31

23

White

Just where they were supposed to be.

McDivitt

Yes.

I followed them a couple of times and said

they were staying up fine.

They were way up.

There wasn't any problem there,
2.10

Engine 2 Status
McDivitt

Second stage pressure stayed right on up there
very high.

Just the way they were supposed to.

There wasn't any problem there,

They didn't

decay all during the first stage.
2.11

Acceleration g's
McDivitt

They weren't bad and I don't know where they went
to on the g meter.

White

Just like riding in an old saddle.

McDivitt

That's right.

It's very comfortable .

Steady on-

set .
White

Not very long.

Gee, we were below--

McDivitt

Wait a second.

This might be a good place to

cover the pogo.

I felt the pogo just prior to

staging, from about 2:15 on to 2:30 .

I could

feel pogo.
White

How much were you getting?

McDivitt

Very little,

I could just feel it pull like this.

Did you feel it at all?

Page 32

- COt~FIDEt ◄ TIM

24

White

No .

McDivitt

I could feel it .

It wasn't uncomfortable enough

where I had to l ift my head or anything.
wasn't thinking about a pogo at all .

I

It wasn't

like I was trying to sit there and think about it.
But as we were going along I could feel this vi­
bration.

And then it just crossed my mind, well

t here is pogo, and then we went on to staging.
But it wasn ' t bad at all .

The amplitude must

have been-White

You were paying more attention to your clocks
while I was watching the system ,gages and I
wasn't really aware of the times that were going
on.

McDivitt

I had my eyes- -

It came around 2: 15 or so and lasted to about 2:30.
Maybe it was 2: 10 or 2:05 , but it wasn't bad .

White

We had one area that I will get into later that I
haven't told you about and that I didn't like.

McDivitt

Oh .

So , I think we hit the pogo and the g ,.s .

2.12 BEX;O

McDivitt

Engine shut down properly.

The lights came on.

Engine~- 2 light went out and the Engine 1 lights
went out.

Just the way it was supposed to at

B~O and staging.

Two Stage 1 lights ON , Stage 2

EOt<I flf)Et ◄ Tl1'c b

Page 33

COt ◄FIB~1'1llAl

25

light OFF, Stage 1 lights OFF.
White

At that time I realized that we were going to
feel the pyros and stuf'f--feel the separation.

It

was a very distinct feeling when we sepa r a ted .

Of

course, we immediately dropped in the thrust .
There wasn't any question,we had a good separation,
in my mind .

This is just the way it was for all

of our separations.

Ev-erytime we separated, it

was very clear that was what had happened.
McDivitt

Oh, yes, there wasn't a:ny doubt about it when
that first stage shut off--Voom!

2. 13

Staging
McDivitt

Staging was just as it should have been.

2. 14 Engine 2 I gnition

McDivitt

Engine 2 started right on up.

Like I mentioned

earlier~the light went out and the tank pressure
went down just a tad, but it stayed way up there,
about two or three times as high as was necessary
for staging.

It never really did decrease.

It

Text continues in the original file (340 pages).

Previous: NASA-UAP-D015 — Astronaut Scientific Debriefings, 1962-1963 · Next: NASA-UAP-D017 — Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing, Part II, 1965

Same topic: title & summary match

Same period: 1965

Same release: Release 03

Same agency: NASA