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DOW-UAP-D183-Correspondence — from Senator Harry Reid, June 2009

File DOW-UAP-D183 is a declassified pdf from Department of War, recording an incident dated 6/24/09 at Washington, D.C., published in Release 08 (2026-11-20). This page carries the original file, its official summary and its full text.

File
DOW-UAP-D183
Agency
Department of War
Incident date
6/24/09
Location
Washington, D.C.
Released in
Release 08 (2026-11-20)
File type
PDF

Topics: AAWSAP & DIRDs

This document is an administrative or programmatic record related to the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP), a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-administered program active from 2008 to 2012. AAWSAP’s official scope of work identified 12 technical research areas relating to potential aerospace threats over a time horizon of more than 40 years. As an administrative record, the file documents how AAWSAP was scoped, organized, tasked, funded, or described at a particular point in time.

This June 2009 letter from Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III requests that portions of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) be placed under a restricted Special Access Program (SAP) with a tightly controlled access list. The letter states that the Senate had directed DIA to assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats, describes ongoing technical work aligning with AAWSAP’s program areas, and asserts that the program had already produced several highly sensitive unconventional findings. On that basis, Reid states that ordinary classified information handling practices, and even conventional SAP procedures, would be insufficient to safeguard some parts of the effort, particularly those involving collection methodology, engineering application, industry participation, and the identities of specialized personnel. The attached material proposes a preliminary SAP structure, including a bigoted-access list, a tentative program timeline through Fiscal Year 2013, and continued roles for both government and BAASS personnel.

AARO Comment: In the administrative record surrounding this program, “Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program” (AATIP) appears in some documents as an alternate name for the same underlying AAWSAP effort, rather than as a wholly separate program. In this context, Senator Reid used the term in public correspondence in lieu of the AAWSAP program name.

Open original file · WAR.GOV page

AI summary

This letter, dated June 24, 2009, was written by Senator Harry Reid to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III. It requests the establishment of a Restricted Special-Access-Program for the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, citing the need to protect sensitive findings on unconventional aerospace technologies. The document outlines specific areas requiring restricted access, including identification methodologies, personnel allocation, and engineering applications, arguing that standard security protocols are insufficient. It includes an attachment listing the preliminary restricted access list for government and contractor personnel, noting the program’s preliminary funding from FY09 through FY13.

Full text

Page 1

------- .. ··--·--·--·
MAJORITY LEADER

HARRY REID
NEVADA

tinitrd �rotes �cnatr
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 24, 2009

I lonorable William Lynn III
Deputy Secretary of Defense
I 010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010
Dear Secretary Lynn:
Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence
Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of
program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to furthcr our
effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being
conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and
controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.
Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AATTP) and study were
first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several higl:ly
sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the
continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the
immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the
information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a
Restricted Special-Access-Program (S/\P) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the
AATIP.
In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of
Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be
specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and
advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to
future systems involving space night, weapons, communications ,.and propulsion, the standard
management and safeguarding procedures for classified information arc not sufficit: nt. Even the
use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project arc
properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the
following portions should be maintained at tht: Restricted SAP level:
•

The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced

technologies associated with AATIP.
o

Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require
nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top
priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).

Page 2

o

•

•

Cndue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP
or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the <laily
AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.

Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.

o

Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the
overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an
unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.

o

Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific
community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on
demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or
affil!ation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.

o

Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a
compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a
properly administered Restricted SAP.

o

Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Puhlic
awareness of an industry's AATJP affiliation may discourage that industry's
further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.

Application and engineering.

o

The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected,
engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval.
These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic
decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program
to those on a strict nigoted List.

o

Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts
within the \vorld of 4uantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory,
gravities, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be
use� with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of
operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, •,ve will require a
small. specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related
functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the
Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program arc assigned lo
further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (sec Attachment 1). These indivitluals
all currently possess the apprqpriatc security clearances and arc already providing unique support
to AATIP.

Page 3

t:Itimatcly, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the C.S. Government but I believe will
directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The ttxhnological insight and capability gained will
provide the C.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its
preeminence as a \\'orld leader.
Thank you in a_dvance from your lime and consideration of this request. If..,.,,..,.,,..,....,..,.,,.,.....----,
f
you or your staff have any questions, please contact!1843(a)(2) l of my staf at l1843(a)(2)

Sincerely,

HJ\ y
United States Senator
HR:11h

Page 4

Attachment 1
Sponsoring Agency: Cndc-tcnnined (DEPSECDEF)
Component-level SAP Central Office: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)
A

Lndassificd Nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (ATII')
Program Length: FY09-FY I J (Preliminary)
Program Funding: FY09-O&M, FYl0-FY 13-TBD

SAP Category Designation: lntclligcncc, DoD Acquisition
FY !0 Preliminary Bigoted List of Con:mmcnt Pcrsomi::I:

I. Honornblc William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)
2. l !onorable Senator l larry Reid ofl\'.evada (Gov't)
3. Honorable Senator Daniel fnouyc of J-lawaii (Gov't)
4. Robert T. Herbert (l.i.S. Senate)
5. MP Person 1
l(Gov't)
6. MP Person 2
l(Gov't)
7. MP Person 91
l(Gov't)
8. MP Person 92
ICCSN)
9. MP Person 93
l(USMC)
10. MP Person 3
(Gov't)
11. MP Person 94
Gov't)
FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AA TIP:

1.
2. MP Person 7
J. MP Person 57

BAASS (CTR)
AASS·(CTR)

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA.
Exemptions l and 5 apply.

Previous: DOW-UAP-D182 — AAWSAP Statement of Work, August 2008 · Next: DOW-UAP-D184 — AAWSAP Talking Paper for Senator Reid Engagement, May 2009

Same topic: title & summary match

Same location: Washington, D.C.

Same period: 2009

Same release: Release 08

Same agency: DoW