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CIA-UAP-019 — Australian Dept of Defense Scientific and Intel Aspects of the UFO Problem

File CIA-UAP-019 is a declassified pdf from CIA, recording an incident dated 1971 at Australia, published in Release 03 (2026-06-12). This page carries the original file, its official summary and its full text.

File
CIA-UAP-019
Agency
CIA
Incident date
1971
Location
Australia
Released in
Release 03 (2026-06-12)
File type
PDF

Topics: Project Blue Book

Dated to 1971, an Australian review of the USAF Project Blue Book. This document was released by the National Archives of Australia.

Open original file · WAR.GOV page

TL;DR

1971: when even the UFOs were still in dial-up mode.

  • CIA, 1971, Australia review of USAF Project Blue Book.
  • Includes US/Aus docs 1940s-1969, UFO reports, investigations, statistical analyses, Soviet concern.
  • No official conclusion in the file

AI summary

CIA-UAP-019 is a document from the Australian Department of Defense discussing the scientific and intelligence aspects of the UFO problem. It includes U.S. and Australian government documents from the 1940s to 1969, covering UFO reports, UAP investigations, and related activities. The text references CIA and USAF projects such as Project BLUE BOOK, Project GRUDGE, and the Robertson Panel, as well as statistical analyses of sightings and concerns about Soviet involvement. It also mentions the Condon Report, classified studies, and efforts to manage public information about unidentified aerial phenomena.

Full text

Page 3

The carly analyses of Uro reports by Usar intelligence
indicated that real phenomena were being reported which had flight
characteristier so far in advance of U.S. aircrart that only an
extra-terrestial origin could be enviseged. A goveroment agency
which later events indicated to be the ClA Ofrico of Sclontific
Intelligepce (osr), studied the UFO reports with the intention of
determiniag the Uro propulsion methods. At that time, OST was
responsible for intelligence on foreign research and development
In nuelear and eissile matters.
2 The ClA hecame elarmed at the cverloading of military
communications during the mass sightings of l9s2: and censidered
the possibility that the USsr may take adventage of such a situa:iok
As a result, osl acting through the Robertson-panel 'meeting of
mid-January lo53, persuaded the USAp to use: Project BLUr BooK as
Uro's, and at a later stage to allccoto
:funds for the Avro advanced , "eaucer" aircraft and the launching or
erash programme into anti-gravity pover: To initiate such progrkmnes
decades ahead of normal scientific development vould indicate 'that
the U.S. Goveroment aeknovledged the existence of advanced "aireral
which presumably used a gravity-control method of propulsion. An
sdditional motivation couid have been the fear that the Ussr vould
achieve this goal before the U.S.
3 By erocting a facade of ridicule, Uhe U.S, hoped to allay
publid alarm, reduce the possibility of the Soviet taking advantage
of Uro mass sightings for either psychological or actual warfare
purposes, and act as a cover for 'the real V.S. "programme of developing
vehicles that emulate UrO performances." The: RAaP togcthor with cany
other countries of the vorld give credenco only to the USar public
facade and appear to have uncritically acceyted the associated
information. This information has beon sidely diseredited by rotiring
U.s. service personnel formerly engaged on UrO investigations, as
well as by scientiata abd private citizens.
4 The conclusions of the Condon report conflict vith its own
contents and has been discredited by many reputable scientists
including the Uro scientific consultant to the USAr. In accordoneo
NationalArchives bfAustralia NAA:A13693,3092/2/000

Page 4

4,dth the recommerdiitiunis nf the Condon report, Project BLUE BOOK
vas terI11inated, but presumably this veu]d ha.vo little effect on

the main progr1-;1,n,me.

5.

It would a.ppenr wrong for Au:stralia to remain ignorant ci'

the true situa'ticr::..

We l&ck an intelligence viewpoint th11.t ca.n

the nature and poasiblo consequences of the problem, ~
scientific vie~~oint that co~ld derive :!ICicntifically valid data
from the reports &nd a public relations viewpoint that ca~ honestly
satisfy public intere:!lt. To overcome these deficiencies in the
Australian iuvestigaliun of UF0 1 s, it would :5eem that a strong ce.s,:i
exists for the acceptance. of the RAAF suggest.ion that another
government department assume responsibility for the investigation
&seess

and analysis o.r UFO report.!.

National Archives of Au,straHa

NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/00Q

Page 5

U.S. OPFICIAL ATTITUDE TO U.P.D•:s
In June of 19,17 the Air Techni~ o.l Int('lligcncc Centre
(ATIC) near Dayton, Ohio, assumed a. re·,pcnsibili ty to investiga.te
the ioi tio.l

1 ::.:ports

cons:iderc~I tho:!. tlui
origin.

of 'flying saucers'.
plHWDllH!llct. Wt!.tl~

Vi tldn a month

ii, 1ou

I"F!tLl o.nd !H·obably of Soviet

Ey the end of' the y .. a.r 1 when ATIC was offie ial ly author iso-i

to invntiga.to under the project code no.n.c of SIGN and with a. high
priority,most nf the investigators lrl'er:: focus:dng on an inter­
planetary ra~her tha11 a. Soviet origin.
cry:stalliz:;-d into

11

in September 1948.

TJJese opi n:i ans were

"'ri tten csti:nate that .,,·as sent to the Pentagon
Vnen the inte rplo.nc to.ry cone lusions were re ,:j ~c .od

on th<J groumls of instifficiant ha.rd evidence, a reaction :set in a.t

ATIC e.gl!l.insti trying to unravel the liFO problem.
2.

In Febru~ry 1949, ATIC personnol ur. Project SIG~ were

replaced Witt> nev personnel

1-0

form Project tHtUJJGE.

A defini·te

attempt vas mado during !.9·19 to use Project GRUDGE to destroy any
acccptani::o of UPO'!!!. The motives for this ;ue not t:lear: po:s:o.ih!y
Air Pore,~ embarnLssmE!.n t at being incap.,.ble of controlling tha
situation <tnd/ :•r a fear of national p{l.nic prompted L"SAF to try and
remove the problem by denying its existence.

Another possible

motive mo.y have been to provide a breathing spncc ror nno Urnr
"inve:stigati ve agency '1 to 1·each some cone lusion; the agency had been
asehting A.TIC through 1948 and, con1.rary to official USAF policy,
vas maintaining a bich level of interest during 1949.

This govcrn~ental

agency '-'IHI not th,~ FBI, e.nd had rcckl!'t, nuclca.· and inti!llig,~ncP.
experts; their pur1,o,;;e was to study OFO n:port,s in an effort to HlltllE!l'
de:,ign data Oil int-erplanetury space sh ip!'I. In lhe light of l.a ter

development~, thiR agency wus almost certainly the CIA.
3.

Project GRUDGE failed to eliminate the UFO problem,

U1"0

reports in 1949 actmdly exceeded the numbr!r in 1918, and several
people who had gained ,1.ccess to earlier offici,d repor!.s wPre ublli
to contnuJic l Lhe USAF.

Journalists gonero.lly !el t that GRCDGE

:reporting represented e. cover to a more serious kno•.!cdgc.

Eventually,

USAF intelligence dE>c ided. thi'.t a fresh approo.ch to the JJr1,bl em "'HS
ne-ccs~ary.

Between Se1,t.r1m·:Jr:r 1951 unu I.he establ:i.shnent of Pro,i(•Ct

BLUE BOOK in March 1952, UFO investigation rugn.incd ndcquo.tc finrinC'inl
and o.dministra:tive :JUpport to once a.gain aaa.ly:se the col lee teu uc.ta,
Projttct BLUE IlOOK was a.ble tu process !Jiu data frci::n 3,200 report,E int.o

a form suitable for their consul tan Ls to bl' :!.blc to use IBM card-

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000

Page 6

2•
•

sorting machines.
~-

The su111me r

{if

1952 sa"'

&

more thaa twenty-fold rise in

the normal r1,1.te of reporhng and inclu~ed I-he two cxtensi ve Jul!·
eigbtings invdviog lia.shington D.C. This marked increase in !'!ightin~:s

bad diverae efl'ect:,.

A cu•npunent. of USAF intcl..1..igence considertJd
th1.t UPO 's W&l'e intcrpl1\11eia!"y spo.cClships \lhich vore about to make

closer ec,utnct,

To prepare the public for this po:isibili ty 1 41

previously cl~ssified reports vere re}Pasei for publication bet~eeo.
AugtJ.st 19~ 2 rnd February 1953.

These reports contradicted the

ear lie?' offic io.1 USAF policy of di511li5siog the reporb as mi5identification:, etc. On the other hand, the CIA regarded tho su~mPr
UFO activity as a throat to national security mainly because the
resulting crowdeo communications and defence forcee involvement
lessened. the lfvel of national a.lertmi:ss r:,gains t possible en!'my P.ttaclt.
5.

.\ 3C ienti!'ic p:.ncl chaired 'Dy H.P. Robert:son was '::onvened b1•

the Office of Scientific 1nte11 igence c!' CU. during mid-January 1953
tor the purpose of recot1m11nding future o.ction on the UFO proble11.
Briefings vcr<; n,a.dc both by CIA a.nd USAF.

ATJr:: per:,onnel

sho•ti11

t:1e

then c l:i.asified two rnovi e films of UPO 's and the early results of
statistical analysis of J,200 reports. Because of the vital issues
invol Vl'Jd, th~ pane I f'e J t re:: t ric ted to recon::mend i ne that the
investigetion be contimrnd, but 'Wi Lh increased personnel and equipn:ent.
'l'he USAF responded proa1ptly '>li th a.n ins true tion to comply vi tb these

recommondntiona.
6.
Th~ CIJ. 1 ho-ever, in a report dated 16 February 1953 aho'o,c,d
a preference to publicly abandon the investigo.tion whil:!it intensifying
the collection Clf data. Hy September 1953 Lhe CIA position had been
la.rgdy achieved with Project BLUE BOOK rcducad from A staff of ten
qualified po:rsonnel operating at a top secret level to a virtually
inactive project involving one airman.

The invc5tigating ~omponPnl

had bel'n tre.nsferred to the 4602nd Air 111 lc.,.ligli'nce Se:rvic e Squadron
vhieh was trained in rapid intelligence procurement and reported to
Air Defence Command and USAF Intellizence '\ia!';hi.ngt.on rel.her than
Bl,IJE DOOK.

Direct accus s be tween the 4602nd AISS and ::.11 USAF uni t.s

vas atnhorized by AFH 200-2 whcrens previously this privilege had

boon gi ve-n to BLUE BOOK.

Al thnugh on1y Llw v.irracrn (first-class)
remained in Sept.e111ber 1943, BLUE BOOK was later built up to one
officer, one sergeant, one secret-ary, and a pa:rL-t.ime·c:-00!:!ultc:1.nt

NAA: A 13693,_____
3092/2/000 _.
__________________

: National Archives of __:_
Australia

___;,

Page 7

3.

f Dr J. All(m Hyrwk, staying at about this level until it was closed
dovn in December 1969.

During Lhis t.inw BLUE BOO){ served mo.inly
as e. moo.ns of supplying unclo.ss ified su111maries of UFO identifice:Li<mB

to the public, a.nd did not form a vitn1 link in collection or
Berious analysis.

7.

Control of public awareness of the UFO situati.:in vas
tightened by the issuing of JAKAP 146 in 1953 which prohibited
service personnel from di.,cussing UFO's by threatening defaulLerc;
with up to 10 years gaol and up to a $10,000 fine. When service
personnel resigned or re tired, howe..-er, 1 t wa.s po:iisible to reTeal
US.AF attitude~ o- opinions even if 11.ctual jR.ta was still rec1 t.dc Le(1 ,
Ia. this way many Intelligence .Dffi::crs associ-o.tcd·-_wi th the UFO problem,
including Major D. Fournet who was BI.CF. BOOK Project Officer at the
Pentagon until l~te 1952, Captatn E. Ruppolt who headed Project
GRUDGE and Prt,ject BLUE .BOOK until September 1')53 and Admiral
Hillenkoetter who directed CIA from it, inception until October 1950,
on retiring froffi tho services, all publicly s~ated that the U.S.
Gover:iment knc., UF0 1 s were extra-torrestial but vu.s ..,.ithholding
this fact fro!D the public.
8.
When the National Investigation Committee on Aerial Phenom~na
(NICAP} was fornllHi in 1955 to counter the publicly suppre3sed USAF
invostigation of UFO's, the firet Cha.irman was Admiral D.S. Fahrney

who h~d directed the Navy's guided missile programme from its
inception. Apft,rt, from Admiral Hillenl~oettt>r, Major Keyboe and
Major Fo11rne-t, other Directors have incluilod Rear Admi!"al H.B. Kno1,les,
General A. Wedemeyer and t:ol J,J. Brye.a (who was .:i. special assistant
to the Ser.retl'l.ry of the Air Foree). To reduce the effect of these
&nd similar defections from o!ficia.l policy after rd,irernP.ni., the
revised JANAP 146E, passed in 1960, made it an offence under the
Eepionage Act if data on UFO's were revealed,
The change in style of USAF reporting before and after the
Robertson penel meeting is clearly indicated in the Project BLUE BOOK
Special Report No. 14,
The body of the rl'port. prep<'-rell hetve.en
March 11)52 and early l95J, i:dthough bicsod in favour of a natural
expll:.na-Licn for UE'O' s, ne"",:irl.'rui l ciss shm,ed mathematically that the
evidence favoured an explanation that was scientifically unknown,
9.

This sect.ion of the 116 page report was not released to the public
other then aa ~ copy to ho consulted, assuming the readnr kn~w uf

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A:1 3693, 3092/2/000

Page 8

4.

4 its existe-nce.
ee.lled

11

Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­

summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely

&lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta 1 but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.;
which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn

insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification
became.
10.

Vi t.hin U1u body of the dif fi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .re po'r l thei-e

il!I an intores~ing diagram.

The product of the estimated obr.erv"r

relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting
relinllility.
a.s t•unkno1.1n

11

Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J

(i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identif i ,.-d

aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed.
Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion"
d"creased with improving reliability.

~ighting
Relia.bili ty

No. of
Reports

Poor

435

Doubtful

794

Good

757
213

Excellent

Uoknovn

(%)

Insufficie111,
Informs.ti en

16.6
13.0

14.0

(,t;)

21.4

24.8

J.6

33.3

'1.2

11.

Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been
e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-,

percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble.
The tshove table contradicts that statement.

Reports of excellent

reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists,

surveyorn 1 mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with
instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The
introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic
int.eq>ri~tation,
In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J
of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h :~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.'

dita hnd been more reliablo.
12,

Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the

unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3
similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the
probability was less than one in 10 28 (i,e. using the American

~ational Archives of Australia

NAA A13693, 3092/2/000

Page 9

4.

4 its existe-nce.
ee.lled

11

Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­

summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely

&lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta 1 but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.;
which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn

insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification
became.
10.

Vi t.hin U1u body of the dif fi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .re po'r l thei-e

il!I an intores~ing diagram.

The product of the estimated obr.erv"r

relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting
relinllility.
a.s t•unkno1.1n

11

Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J

(i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identif i ,.-d

aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed.
Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion"
d"creased with improving reliability.

~ighting
Relia.bili ty

No. of
Reports

Poor

435

Doubtful

794

Good

757
213

Excellent

Uoknovn

(%)

Insufficie111,
Informs.ti en

16.6
13.0

14.0

(,t;)

21.4

24.8

J.6

33.3

'1.2

11.

Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been
e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-,

percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble.
The tshove table contradicts that statement.

Reports of excellent

reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists,

surveyorn 1 mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with
instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The
introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic
int.eq>ri~tation,
In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J
of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h :~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.'

dita hnd been more reliablo.
12,

Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the

unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3
similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the
probability was less than one in 10 28 (i,e. using the American

~ational Archives of Australia

NAA A13693, 3092/2/000

Page 10

5.

4f system, the odds were ten thousand trillion trillion to one
ago.in:5t the unk,rni.n:5 being the same as the known:s). Since the
consultants !'tad arbitrarily called al 1 gni~n firoball!5 a.ml short
dura. tion (i.e. less than f i vc seconds) n.1.ght-timc si.ghtings ns
known nstronornicltl
tba.t cntogo1'y.

0l1j11r. t.R

!,here was

tin

undue preponderance in

Hence, as1rnming that 11'> ·'1'3trononlical objocts were

left in the unknni.ns, the :stati:stical tests ..-ere repented vi th

astronomical i,lentifice.tions removed.

i.-~ tri l lior. ~ril lien to one-.

Tne odds were reduced to

The ena.lysts could not find a way

to reduce th.:?se odds sufficiently further to warrant additional
tel!!ting, and i rra.tionally considered. the results to ba "inconc lu~ ive 11 •
lJ.

While PROJECT BLUE DOOK cndao.Tourcd to reduce the official

number of uukr_o.:ns - in 1957 they claimed. ouly 14 out of l tQQ(i
sightings remained unidentified - the covert programme expanded
considcra.bly.

'l'he govcrnn:ent agency ( al-no:it certainly CIA) tha.~

had been collecting da.ta on l:F(' per!orma:ice a.nd propulsion methods
durini; 1948-52 presu:nably inf' luenced U.S. goYernmen tal funding of
certain 'lava.need projec·l:i. One project was the Canadian Avro sau;:-er.
ill Gctober

1955. showed a typical

in many UFO reports.

The Secretary of t¾I!

A dra.win1 oft.his saucer 1eleo.scd
flying disc a!"

dt~<;t~ r i !:rnd

Air Force, D,J,., Q~.,arles, appeared moderately confident that such
a vehicle '1ould be s1:cce!'l:!irul1y develop!:!tl oy the U.S.
14.

A more utounding deci:don en the part of the U.S. Government
was ·1,o allocate considerable:- funds to investigate gravity and a.
■ eans

nf controiling g:ravity.

Despite the fact that science b.::.d

not attained a Jqvel of competence to d~al with either gravity or
anti-gravity probler.1s aJld the only tt1oory tha.t mJ.ght be ui>:tilicuhle
W&!

Einstein's Unified Field Theory 'l\'hich was still incomplete e.t the

time of his death, tbn U.S. chose to support gix universitios and
government agencies in an all-out drive to conquer the proble~.
TL is significant t.hat at this Lime thll' cu.-rent Urnories on UFO

pro:puhlon were a ndxture of gra:v.i ty con.trol and eleat:ro...ma.gn,etic

propul.lio.n ..
15.
Dli.r:lng J. 955 1 beee,use :insuttie:i,t1.1:1t, $1:,aft C()U.J!,d. be recrtlli,i,•)•cl.
for the project, recourse waa made to an urgent appeal for theoretical
phy,.i:-,:d. s1,$ e,ni:l. !1Ht1:,ha111.111,t,ie i,MUI. fr~11ll. A:~~1:u; Ha,rwell, U.K.

Thtl Si.I.

Gravit:,, Rasea1•,ch C,entres btiinlil adabl islu?d Yere at thll: Institute for

A4vanced s:t.udy (P.1~:i..n.,111e1:,on., H,,J,), Prim:et,01:1 U111. i . nr'sity, Un.1.v,:rsU:y
,;I

1 . ,,tiJatio,~,all Archives o•f Australia

NAA: A13693 1 3~92/2t0q1Q

Page 11

6.

~ of Indiana, Purdue Univenity Rel!learch Pounda.tion, University of
Norlh Ca.ru) ina and the Mlls.sachutH! Gt.s Ins Ii '..u Le 01' 't echnology
through the (Roger Bn.hson) Gravity Ras">a.rch Institute (New Bost1n
H.H.). The latter institute is a non-rr~fi't. organization found·.:d
in 1949 vith Geo:cge M. Ridecnit &s Pre!'.l~dcnt. Jt 1<as believed that
to make a gravity motor, a gravity dj ffcrentie.l lla.s required 'o'hi ch
ncccssitntcd the discovery of an ili:ml&.t,or, deflector or absorber

of gravity.

By 1955, 485 esl!lays had hcen written on this subject

and awards totalling Sl0,800 mad0 for c~iginal contributions.
16.

The l!lcienti.st.s invu1ved i.nclwfod Teller from Univereity

of Califox•nia, C'ppenheim1;1r and F.J. Dyson cf tha Institute of
.ldvanced Studies, J.A. Vheeler -an~ ,&j chord 'Ai'+fow:tt·t of Princeton,
Va.cle.y- Hlavaty r,f University of Indiana {who hP_d !ourked with
Einstein in Prague) and Stanley Duser.

gravity.

Tho objective l1a.s to control

During 1955 the followiug firms entered into gravity

&nd/or electromagnetic programme5:

Glenn L. M11-rtin Av"i at.ion Co.

(specifically Dr B. Heirn from Goettingen University and Dr P.
Jordan from Ha.n:iiurg University), Convair of San Die 6 o, Bell Aircraft

of Buffalo, Sikorsky Divi5ion, Lear Inc. o:r Sant.a Moidca., Clarke.
Electronics of :Palm Springs, California, a.nil. Sperry Gyroscope
Division of Great Neck, Long Island, N.Y.

17.

Such a.n intensive onslaught on the gravity enigma was

entirely irrational from the standpoint of conventional science,
and can only be rationalized within the context of a firm belief
tbat UFO' s \l'erl' real and thE.t the in tell il!7tmces behintl thew. know
how to control gravity. The drivu to b~rnesE this power before
the USSlt could do !O 1.-ould be a .strong incentive for the U.S.
GoTernment to fully support an anti-grn.v.ity programme. By 1966,
46 sapa.ra.te projects of this nature were being financially supported,

33 of which wcro under tho ~upcrvision of the U.S. Air Poree.
Al though details of most of these projects havA: been kP-pt. c·l HSS if.ii~d
it would appear that generally they have not been successful. Work
on gravitationn.l vuvcs by J. Vcbcr and his associates under USA~
Ca.mbrid.ge ReseA.rch L11.bora.tory ju1·.isdic l,lan hal:! he1:1n reported.

fairly extensively since 1966,
18.

Dudng August of 1965 Project ELl,;E BOOK rocci vcd 262

reports which was about six times the a.veraee number for a month
a.nd 'Was

twice any pr1:.•v l.ous rnon th s i nee November 1957.

National Archives of Australia

On

NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000

Page 12

7.
28 S4-pte1nber 1965 Pfaj, Gen. Ll'Bailly, Dintctor of Information,
formally requested tho Air Force Scientific Advisory Board to
review Project i3Lm: BOOK. The review aug::;eated tha.t the lirni tc>i!
Project BLUE BO JK staff 11.nd the official inves ti,ga ting of ricer~
did not possess the tcchnicul competence Lo properly identify lne
phenomena and that university tea.ms should be appoi.nted to
invl'stigo.te selec tcd sightings.

This cone lusion wn.s supported b:•

the Rouse Armed Servic1~s Commit.tee which met on April 5Lh 1966
in the shndo.._ or a pub lie furore consequent to the USAF idf. nti ::'), ng
the ,rn 11-public ised Michigan sightings as b1d.ng si.amp gas.

The

Colarado University 1,ns s1?lecte-d for the task and Dr Ed.re.rd U. Ccndon
appointed to le,~d the project with o.n in .. tia.l allocation of $Jl) ,OOC
later raised to $525,000.
19.

The Colorado project became di!!Cr•}di tad when Dr Condon

atr..ted publicly un 25th Janu.:i.ry 1967 that "my a.ttitude rigt..t Go,..
ie thot there's nothing to it, but I'm not supposed to reath a
conclusion for another ycar 1' . The reve&l ing of a memorandum
outlining a method to trick the public, ~ombined with & grnoral
dis!la.ti:,fact:;.on ~t Conrlon' s biassed ai.ti tude J led to the dismissal
and re:,ignation of mo•t of the staff &ftrr most of the investigations
had been made but no L compll!tcly written up. The fioal report o.f' 9(:}
poges lacked coherence, Condon's conclusions Wl'rc ~t variance with
individual staff conclusions, although only Condon's conclusions were
J>Ub lie ised.
Aa a result of the Condon re port, USAF c losi!d do,.n
Project BLCE BOOK shortly before the .\merican Association for the
Adv1rncerucn i, of' Sc iea1.:o held a special mc(iting 1,o counter-act th~

effect of the Condon report. The Chairman of the Special (;orumittuP 1
Dr Thornton Pa.gl?, was ono of tbe signatories to the Rob£rtson r(~por t.

20.

Dr J. Allen Hynl?k, l!cientitic consultant to Project Blue

Book 1948-69 1 bogo.n his association with n convicticm that 11.ll
sightings could be conv~ntionally explainud,

Even though doubts
grew in his mind, he found hjmself obliged to support offjcial USAF
public policy. Since 1966, ho-.;ever, he has become more outspol,en
against the l;SAF attitude and has as.! i!!lcd ·to convcme both
congressional hearings and scientific syr:1.pos in on the subj cc t.
AHhough ini Li 1ll ly :mp port i.ng the Condon Comrai ttee he became
di£illusiancd and critical of it with thP pnssng~ of time. It is
quite clear that Dr Hynek along with many o thcr reputable sc i(!ntis ts
do not accept the USAP explrmation of misidentifies t.ion, hyst.cr in or

National ~r~ives of Australia

NAA: A13693, 3092/2/00_0

Page 13

RAAP ATTITUDE TO UFOLS
:
The Diroctorate of Air Force Intelligence is the componeat
of the Ruur that is responsible for the analysis of all official
reporting of Unidentified Plying Objeets. At no stage has there
been more than one port-time ofricer allocated to this taak.
Initial investigation of reports is often undertaken by a part-time
investigotor from near-by air bases. The Raar admits that its
intorests Iie solely in the area of air defence and it lacks both
interest and competence to consider the scientific aspects, A
1957 request for the Soientirie Intelligence section of JiB to accept
UFo responsibility vas rejected by JIB, In l968, the Department of
Air stated that it intended "to take up. further the question of
Commonvealih departmonts, e:g, Defenco, Supply, Bducation and
Science, Prime Minister's Dopartment etc. to see whether some other
Commonwealth Agency is better placed to assume responsibility for
Unidentified Plying Objects, At the same time we vould maintain
our interest in the matter and work with any other Commonxealth
ageney who is considered to be more appropriate as a co-ordinating
agency for the Gommonvealth as: a whole", There does not arpear to
have been aoy fulfillment of this intention to soek Commonwealth
assistance.
2* In support of the Raar's admission of scientific disinterest,
an identification list of all sightings made between l9oo and l965
contains 15 identifications. of. Venus, not one of which is valid.
In every case Venus vas in a totally difrerent part of the sky or not even
above the horizon. Out of 37 meteor identifications, only 9 could
possibly be meteors and even several of those cases would be doubtful.
This off-band unscientific attitude to identification did not escape
the notice of the press or various scientists,
3. In goneral, the RAAr attitude has been guided by the USAp
public releases which vere aimed at allaying public interest by
denying: the reality of UFo's, Consequently, most of the Australian
reports vere given identifications vithout a great concern for
rational correlation, Most investigators and colloctors regarded
their Uvo tasks as an intrusion into thoir more legitimate basks.
As a result, there hos been a negligible scientific anelysis of the
data and most opinions oxpressed by Darl have been, largely a reflection
of the USAP public attitude, With the present reduced staff of DAPI
National Archives of Australia: NAA: A13693, 3092/2/000

Page 14

9.

#
it is unl:ikely tlmt. UFO report!! will receive any treatment beyond
filing.

4.

If Au:<. t,r,11ia is to follov the U. S, lead,._ instead or

follo1'.'.i.1ie the public USAF a.ttitudo, it would hf' prPferablc to

follow 1-hc USAF/C:::.A. role of cnncentratins ori gP..ining a kno1oledge
of the po\.'er !!ourccs involved.

Howcvo-r, it may be preferable to

&ct inc.lependent1y of the U.S. a.nd initia.te a programne that is
scientifically sound and intollectually honest towards unravelling
the UFO 111y:r>tcry.

Ill such

11.

venture, it ma.y be worthwhile 'tforking

ao11c-..,ha-L c:1o:.;er t.o the public than i.s usual

I

National Archives of Australia

in the U.S. and U.K.

NAA: A13693, 3092/2/0Q0

Page 15

APPENDIX "X"
ATION
Event
24,6,47 Arnold sighting of nine "sauc ers" creatcs publie interest
6.47 Investigations initiated by Air Technical Intelligence
Contre (Atld) or Air Material Command (AMD, Army" Air Forces)
at Wright-Patterson Air Foree Base near Dayton, Ohio,
Initially Soviet advanced airdraft vere suspeoted,
26.7.47 National Security Act creates both the VSar and CIA.
23.9.47 Lt Gen, Tvining (AM) requested the Commander Army Air Forces
to issue an authority, priority and code name for the
investigation of "flying dises"," Preliminary conclusions
by Arc Vere that the phenomenu gore "real and not viaionory
controlled. Any U.S. attempt to design aircraft of similer
to other projeets, Investigatinns by ANC Would contiauo
pending further adrice.
30.12.47 Authority given to ANc to investigate the phonomona on a
priority" 2A basis: under tho codc-name Project Sign.
Minimum elassification wes Restwieted, reports were to be
made quarterly and data exchanged vith interested parties,
15.1,48 UsAr officially a separate service.
22,1.48 Project Sign starts orfieially.
24.7.48 Noarecollision botween DoD and Uro pronpt ATIc to vrite
in Bstimste of the Situation.
9,48 The Top Secret Batimate vas forvarded to the Pentagon, Tho
conclusion that Uro's vere of interplanetary origin was not
acceptable to the Air Force Ghief of Stafr (Oeneral Vandenbergl
who insieted on domonatrable proof not circumstautial
detailed photographs:
13,12,48 Dr J,B. Lipp, of the Rand Corporation rorliod to the Diroctor
or Rescarch and Dovelormont, UsAy, that if the flying objects
vere inter-planetary they would most likely originate: from
Mars although intelligent life as we know it vould "be more
oceupied vith survival than ve are on Barth", Our present
technology Gonnot Gonceive as to bor an. inter-stellor raoe
could roach Bartb, evde: Shough it is conceded that there is
a high probability that intelligent life does exist within
say 16 light-years from Barth.
1,49 USAr orders Project Sign to becone Projeet Grudge vhich
should terminato before tho end of l949.
2, 49 Pinal report of Project Sign (TR-2274-IA of the Technical
Intelligonce Division AMo) recommended Ihat only a
minimum effort bo dovoted to recording, analyzing and
evaluating reports, but on the other hond where Taotdel
National Archives of Australia NAA: A13693, 3092/2/000

Page 16

ond dnta on Size, and shope is involved,, every etfort
shonld: be made to dolleet, Uhls ovidence. Radio alortal to
othor ni)itary unito should be mode.
11,2.49 Projeet Sign officially becomos Project Grudge, According
to Ropelt, 9
vere conpolled to loave, after vbich they vere replaced" by
1949, Grudge personnel did not follow up reports.
8.49 Becret Technical Report No. 102 A0 49/15-100 "Unidertifiod
with tha concluaion Uhat all reporte vere the result of
misidentiricatibns, mass hysteria and hoaxes even though
* the
report vas declassified 1 Angust l952.
27.12.49 :
flying aaucer projeet had boen terminated.
3.50 Publication of a report, proviously clenred by the U.S.
Army, desoribing the trocking, of a Uro by on offiojal tyam
provibg ground, Pron ihe traoking date, it vas concluded
14.9.51 On leacning that ATic was not investigating UFo reports,
the VSar Director of Intelligence (General "Cabell)" ordered
Projeet Grudge to be revitalleed.

Text continues in the original file (19 pages).

Previous: CIA-UAP-018 — Report of Unusual Flying Object Sightings and Attendant Scientific Activity

Same topic: title & summary match

Same release: Release 03

Same agency: CIA