AARO DHS Kona Blue
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TL;DR
They killed KONA BLUE faster than a holiday gadget returns.
- AARO PDF titled 'KONA BLUE', DHS correspondence, dated 20230718.
- Describes a terminated SAP (May-Dec 2011) studying emerging aerospace tech, four research centers, monitoring protocols.
- Program was terminated December 2011; no further official activity noted.
AI summary
A Department of Homeland Security document titled "AARO DHS Kona Blue" details the KONA BLUE program, a terminated special access program focused on investigating emerging technologies and materials. The document includes correspondence between DHS and the DoD, declassification details, and project descriptions. It outlines four research centers focused on advanced aerospace vehicles and mentions UAPs, advanced technology, and remote sensing. The text references funding, contracts, facilities, and personnel for the program, with dates including 20230718 and 20360425. It also describes a plan for experimental centers to monitor and study advanced aerospace vehicles and anomalous phenomena at specific U.S. locations. The document includes site-monitoring protocols, biosensor integration, data analysis, and specialized centers, and is classified as UNCLASSIFIED. The KONA BLUE program, initiated in May 2011, was terminated in December 2011 due to insufficient justification and documentation. The text also references the AATI program, initiated in 2008, and its connection to KONA BLUE.
Full text
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February 5, 2024
The Honorable Kathleen H. Hicks
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010
Dear Dr. Hicks:
Thank you for your letter on September 28, 2023.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees to provide the Department of
Defense (DoD) with documents and relevant information associated with KONA BLUE. KONA
BLUE was a DHS prospective special access program (PSAP) terminated on February 10, 2012.
The following actions were taken:
• All DHS documents associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP are declassified and
approved for public release.
• The strike-out method was utilized to retain visibility of prior classifications and
redactions were made based on policy and legal review.
• All pertinent DHS records have been searched and no additional information
associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP has been discovered.
I appreciate your continued cooperation and support for DHS. Should you wish to
discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Kristie Canegallo
Acting Deputy Secretary
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP-SICRERWKONA BLUENOFORN Homeland
HANDLEVA SPECIAL ACCLSS CHANNELS ONLY Security
Declassified by: RichuandD. McComb
DHS, Chief Security Officer
Declassified on: 20230718
(TSHKBHNF) KONA BLUE
DHS, Science & Technology
Classified By:U/S for S&T (OCA) UNACKNOWLEDGED, WAIVED DHS-003-6-0002/11
Classified Reason: 1.4(e) Copy 1 of 1
Declassify On: 20360425 Prospective Special Access Program Slide 1 of 9
HANDLEH PINELG-ONLY
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS I is acknowledged as the Sponsor o SIONAI, DRAFT - DO NOT RELEASE
UNCLASSIFIED DHS-003-6-0002/11
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSFCRETWKONA BLUEINOFORN Homeland
HANDLE VLA SPECIAL ACCESS CHANNELS-ONIY
(U) Advanced Technology Threat Security
(U) Project Description
(TS/KB/NF) This project will investigate, identify and
analyze sensitive information , advanced materials and
technologies to increase the basic knowledge of potential
emerging and/or disruptive scientific and technical data.
(TS//KB//NF) This project addresses basic , applied, and
advanced research and technology demonstrations in order
to identify and anticipate threats to the U.S. homeland. A
unified approach will be used for data collection and
analysis, advanced technology acquisition, applied
technology theory demonstration, and consciousness
studies.
(U) Planned Research Objectives (U) Describe the potential outcome(s)
(U/IIVSACO)DHS S&T has the prospect to identify a unique
(U) All deliverables are dependent on the initial analysis class of scientific and technology threats and opportunities.
and assessment of associated existing and discovered (U/HvsACO)Achievement of basic research goals will place
DHS S&T at the forefront of applied science and
information and materials. opportunities involving advanced technology.
(/HIvsAcO)Customers/Partners: DHS Components, USG,
and private sector.
FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
(S/KB//NF)Total Funding ($M) 12 25 35-50 TBD TBD TBD TBD
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS ) is acknowledged as the sponsor of this work - PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT - DO NOT REI.FASE 1
UNCLASSIFIED DHS-003-6-0002/11
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP-SEORET/KONA DLUEWNOFORN Homeland
HANDLEVIA SPECIAL ACCESS EHANNEISONLY
(U) Advanced Technology Threat Security
1.(U) What is the research need?
(S/KB//NF) This research is a Congressional interest item.
(TS/KB/NF) This research addresses the critical need for the United States science and technology
community to identify global emerging and/or potentially disruptive technologies that can have a
significant impact on homeland security. Based on analytical assumptions and uncertainties, this
research is pivotal to defining the impact of global science and technology on the elements for
national power and security. The focused collaborations on the knowledge based deliverables ensure
that the Departmental requirements, and those of the interagency partners, are addressed and
provided opportunities for follow on efforts and additional collaboration on scientific investigation
and technology exploitation.
(TS//KB/NF)The Department 's interest area with this project targets is the scientific and technical
investigation, threat analysis, and assessment of materials and data of unique origin, engineering,
and purpose. The knowledge gap this research is addressing is emerging or disruptive materials and
technologies that can potentially impact national power and security.
TODSE
HANDLEVIA SPECL
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSECRLTIKONA RLUEINOEORN
HANDLEVIA SPECIAL-ACCESS CHANNELS ONLY Homeland
Advanced Technology Threat Security
2. (U//H IvSACO) What is the technical/scientific approach?
applications are potentially harmful to U.. vital and major interests; and 2)what vulnerabilities and
opportunities does any new technologies present. Successful concept and principal validation
provides strategic scientific and technical direction, focus and planning for technological exploitation
and solutions, and the strategic planning for countermeasure and mitigation efforts throughout the
homeland security enterprise. Specific methodologies used to assess available material,
technologies, and observations may require nuanced approaches that which will undoubtedly be of
significant interest to foreign intelligence security services.
(TS/KB//NE) Four research centers — the Data Collection and Analysis Center, the Advanced
Technology Center, the Consciousness Center, and the Technology Application Center will
investigate and inventory available information and materials, investigate emerging and/or
disruptive advanced materials and controls, alternative energy/power source/generation
opportunities, temporal translation; human effects and interface, signature reduction and weaponry,
as well as technology integration.
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UNCLASSIFIED
FOPSECREIWKONA-ILUEMNOPORN Homeland
MANDLEVLASPECIAL-ACCESS-CHANNELS-ONIY
Advanced Technology Threat Security
3.(U) What are the anticipated results and value of this research?
and assessments of a previous investigatory USG programs and to identify and define the impact of
the unique science and technology applications on homeland security. The exploratory research
provides opportunity to increase our basic knowledge of a science or phenomenology. This effort
provides the potential to influence technological solutions and strategies to sustain the elements of
national power and homeland security.
(TS//kB/NF) Success of this research is predicated on the scientific investigation and assessments of
available material; continuity of effort can generate 'actionable' follow-on research contributing to
continuing discovery, research investments, possible countermeasure technology and USG policy
development.
4.(U) What is innovative about this work?
(TS//KB//NF) This knowledge-based research addresses the analytical assumptions and uncertainties
of emerging and disruptive technologies or material that could potentially threaten vital and major
U.S. interests such as the security of land, air and sea borders; and citizens; or critical infrastructure or
economic resources. The potential also exists that outcomes and follow-on research and evaluation
efforts will provide the U.S. with a unique ability to increase any of the elements (political, economic,
military, and moral psycho-social (social cohesion)) of national power, as well as enhancing national
security and developing resilience to disruptive technology potential.
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSECRET/KONA
HANDLFVIA SPECIAL ACCEES CHANNELSONIY Homeland
Advanced Technology Threat Security
5.(U) What are the next steps?
that are the basis for further community of interest proof-of-principal and proof-of-concept efforts
that will determine the strategies for adaptation, countermeasures, and mitigation through applied
research initiatives. Follow-on efforts allow for the identification and resource planning and
execution for immediate, near-term and far-term technology solutions to monitor and manage risk,
for border and security operations and infrastructure protection, exploitation of new techniques and
analytical tools also enhance continued research opportunities.
(TS/KB/NF) Due to the advanced nature of the research in this project and security considerations,
no defined applied research efforts to this program are specifically identified at this time. However,
the research results of this project should be readily used by the Department in the future. There are
no known transition concerns at this time.
6.(U) Are there collaborators or partners involved in this project?
(U/HIvsACO) No, not at project inception. There is limited collaboration with the USG and
interagency involvement is anticipated.
HANDLEVI ONLY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSLCRETWKONA PLUE/NOFORN Homeland
HANDLE VIA EPECIAL ACCESS CHANNELS ONLY.
Advanced Technology Threat Security
7. (U) What is the history of this project?
(TS//KB//NF) Advanced Threat Identification Program first sponsored in the FY 2008
Defense Supplemental Act by Senators Reid and Inouye with a $10M add; FY 2010
Defense Appropriations Act included a $12M add for the project.
8. (U) How much funding will be necessary to complete this effort as described?
(S/KB/NF) FY12 (minimum of $12M), FY13 ($25M), FY14 ($35-50M), FY15 17 (TBD)
HANDLEVLA CHANNELSONLY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TORSECRETWKONA WLUEWNOFORN
MANDLEVIL SPECIALACCESS CHANNELS ONLY Homeland
(U)Advanced Technology Threat Security
(S/KB/NF)The technical/scientific approach consists of four research centers:
1) Data Collection and Analysis, 2) Advanced Technology, 3) Consciousness, and 4) Integration.
#1 (U/HIVSACo)National Institute for Discovery Center:
regarding sightings, evidence collection and subsequent laboratory analysis on advanced technology
behavior within the territorial limits of the United States and immediately-adjacent Pacific and
Atlantic Ocean areas.
(S/KB/NF) The Experimental Division initially will consist of a well-studied experimental location
that has been researched for approximately 15 years. The intent is to locate, calibrate and then subject
other sites to the same intensive study as the primary location. Within each location, focus remote
sensing capabilities on all known hot spots (locations with repeated/frequent reports of activity).
(S//KB//NF) The Medical Division will have a small team of medical analysts under the direction of
the chief physician and the deputy administrator that will organize data into a threat analysis based
on medical findings including but not limited to: (a) deaths and injuries as a result of interaction with
advanced aerospace vehicles, (b) medical injuries as a result of other anomalies (c) collateral
injuries/physiological effects to family members.
(S/KB//NF) The Data Analysis Division will conduct analysis to technical design and prototyping of
AAV performance, up to advanced theoretical and computational studies of multi-physics problems.
TOR SECRETIKO BLLIEINIOEORN
HANDLE VIA SPECI CHANNELSONILY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TADSECRETKONARLUEUNOEORN
HANDLE VIA OPECIALACGESS OIANNELS ONLY Homeland
Advanced Technology Threat Security
#2 (S//KB//NF) ) Advanced Technology Center:
(S//KB//NF) Access recovered advanced technology and any earlier assessments to determine threat
capability and any potential countermeasures possible against the advanced technology.
(S/KB//NF) Collect oral histories from already identified sources retired military, intelligence, and
contractor personnel to assist in locating additional recovered advanced technology.
#3 (S/KB/NF) ) Consciousness Center:
(S//KB//NF) ) Collect critical data utilizing remote sensing in order to determine the activity and
purpose of the advanced technology, especially any threat posed.
(S/KB//NF) ) In an expanded role, remote sensing and related techniques may present an invaluable
aid in countering illicit activities conducted against the U.S. Demonstrations of capability will be
made.
#4 (S//KB//NF) ) Integration Center:
(S/KB/NF) Focal point for the integration of information and data from the other centers, and
report writing; follow-on basic and applied research proposals and efforts to be identified.
The U.S. Department of Ilomeland Security (DHS ) is acknowledged as the sponsor of this work PRE-DECISioNAL DRAFT - DO NOT REI EASE 8
DHS-003-6-0002/11
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SLCRETKONA ILUENOTONN Homeland
HANDLF VIA SPLOIAL-ACCESS-CNANNFLSONLY
Advanced Technology Threat Security
(U) Next Steps:
U/SST recommendation
SAPOC member pre-briefs
SAPOC decision briefing
ONY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSECRETWMONA-ELUE/NOFORN Homeland
HANDLEVIASPECLALACCESSCHANNELSONLY
Advanced Technology Threat Security
Back up
TOP EI/NOEODN
ULANDLEVU ONLY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSECRETWKONAPLUEMNOFORN Homeland
HANDLEVIA SPECIALACGESSCIIANNIULSONLY
Advanced Technology Threat Security
Points of Discussion:
• Funding Amount/Delivery- Bob H/Mike A discussions; FY12: $12M; FY13: $25M
• Contracts
• SOW
• Facilities:
• SCIF: planner? Size? Location? Amt of use? opn'l configuration?
SCIF accreditation in LV; Locations?
Personnel: cover, ci prog
DHS (*+1 detailee) What are the requirements? How funded?
Other: security classification guide
NCR/Other
Equipment_- comms/IT
TOP SECRET//KONA BLLE//NOEORN
HANDLE VIA SPECIAL ACCESS CHANNELS ONIY
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOPSECRET/KONA BLUEANOFORN Homeland
-HANDLEVIASPECIALACCESS CHANNILS ONIY
Advanced Technology Threat Security
Authorities
Technology Readiness Assessment Process. Section 308 (USC 188) an amendment adding:
(d) Technical Risk Assessment Process
(In General. The
HANDLEVI ONY
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UNCLASSIFIED
AILI
DHS
Company X
Advanced Tech
Center
#1
-Data Collection Division Company Y
·Experimental Division
·Medical Division Consciousness Center
-Data Analysis Division
#4
Integration Center
Homeland TOP SECRET/KONABLLE/NOEORN
Security LANDLE VLA SDE NNELSONLV
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UNCLASSIFIED
DHS Research
Council
Company X
Company Z
#2
Advanced Tech
Center
#1
-Data Collection Division #3
.Experimental Division Company Y
•Medical Division Consciousness Center
Data Analysis Division
#4
Integration Center
Homeland TOP SECRET//VO
Security HANDLE VIASPI
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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SEC HENAEARN
HANDLE-VIA-SPECIALAECESS-CHANNELS-ONLY-
The following information is presented in accordance with the guidelines contained in
Appendix 1 of DHS Instruction 140-04-001, Special Access Program Implementation,
08/13/2009
Question 1. Program Description (Key program objectives/milestones)
The Advanced Technology Threat Program will consist of seven operational centers:
1.Data Collection Center
2. Data Analysis Center Declassified by: Richard D. McComb
3 Advanced Technology Center DHS, Chief Security Officer
Experimental Centers Declassified on: 20230718
Consciousness Center
6. Medical Center
Education Center
Overall key program objectives and milestones for each center are as follows:
Data Collection Center
Develop Interet-based site(s) for advanced aerospace vehicle reporting
Expand existing data warehouse (200,000 reports)
Deploy in-house investigators on select cases
Operate liaison center for cooperation with state, local, tribal police, and FBI
Data Analysis Center
Coordination center (hub) of all other centers
Maintain in-house technical, computational, and laboratory facilities capable of
physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering analyses
Advanced Technology Center
Analyze recovered technology in collaboration with major aerospace and electronics
Companies
Set up protocols for obtaining access to materials newly acquired
Operate an assessment team consisting of the best scientists and engineers available
to the goverment
Collect retirees' oral histories on recovered technology and present location
Classified By: Under Secretary for Science & Technology (OCA) DHS-003-6-0006/11
Class Reason:1.4 (e) Copy 1 of 1
Declass On:20360425
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Experimental Centers
Determine geographical locations within the U.S. where anomalous activity occurs on a•
Experimental Centers
Determine geographical locations within the U.S. where anomalous activity occurs on a
regular basis
Subject at least two of the best locations to intense sensor and human observation study
while monitoring activity at others
Consciousness Center
Expand on remote viewing and remote communication to communicate, retrieve data,
and transport across dimensional/space-time barrier
Develop remote viewing countermeasures
Study consciousness interactions with, and control of, technology
Medical Center
Study physiological and psychological effects of interaction with vehicles and
anomalous phenomena
Education Center
Develop volunteer corps (expenses reimbursed) to support the collection efforts of the
Data Collection Center
Continue to maintain the world's largest libraries on advanced aerospace vehicles and
associated phenomena
Question 2
Justification for Need
a)Remote vision, remote communication, and de/re-materialization techniques to
observe, communicate, retrieve data, and transfer matter across dimensional and space-
time barriers will undoubtedly be of an utmost interest if not a top collection priority for
adversarial intelligence/security services. Countermeasures against such techniques would
also be a collection priority.
b) Recovered AAV technology exists in and is accessible only within a SAP construct.
UNCLASSIFIED 2
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UNCLASSIFIED
c) Retrieval and integration of historical data from high value personnel with
knowledge of recovered AAV technology and present location of recovered material is
accessible only within a SAP construct.
d) Undue attention by other United States government, or private sector entities, not
involved with the program, or any international interest, will directly or indirectly
interfere with the daily program mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the
program.
e) Due to the highly specialized nature of the program, overt acknowledgement of
personnel involved in the program will lead to unnecessary security risks.
f) Without the appropriate SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise of
specific features of this program, namely those in a) and b), would result in grave
consequences, perhaps irreversible, to the security of the United States.
Question 3 Budget Proposal
TBD
Question 4 Total Number of Personnel to be Accessed
Fifteen
Question 5
Significant program events, milestones, and goals for FY 2012-2013 are as follows:
Introduction
The following is a broad Program structure to address the Advanced Aerospace Vehicle (AAV)
problem with regard to potential threat. The structure consists of two primary components, or
Centers:
(1) an Advanced Technology Center that addresses evaluation and exploitation of
advanced technological hardware and associated documentation obtained to date
and,
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ONLV
(2) an Experimental Centers effort to address the gathering of further data
concerning AAV and related anomalous phenomena from specific geographical
sites on the basis of site-monitoring.
In support of this proposed two-pronged focus, a number of additional Centers are required:
Data Collection Center
Data Analysis Center
Consciousness Center
Medical Center
Education Center
1. Data Collection Center
• Develop Internet-based site(s) for advanced aerospace vehicle (AAV) reporting.
Expand the current data warehouse (which currently comprises 11 separate
databases with over 200,000 AAV reports, the vast majority of which occurred
after 1947) by expanding case numbers within each of the eleven databases.
Utilize multiple teams of in-house investigators to investigate eye witness
cases involving AAV technology with the following criteria: (a) more than one
eyewitness (b) less than 600 feet from witness (c) physical evidence (traces on
ground/vegetation), (d) electromagnetic effects, (e) physiological/pathological
effects.
Expand the investigative equipment inventory necessary to fully equip
expanded investigative teams. (The in-house equipment inventory will be
itemized upon request).
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Utilize selected investigations from other professional groups with
experience in AAV investigations. This will increase data collection coverage of
these events in the United States.
Expand liaison center with rural law enforcement (highway patrol, sheriff
departments, police departments), US Coastguard (under DHS auspices), US
border surveillance (under DHS auspices), US Fish and Wildlife Service
(under Department of Interior), Park Game wardens (under National Park
Service) and Federal Aviation Administration (current system includes all air
traffic control and commercial/private aircraft pilots).
Deliverables:
Internet-site and master data warehouse.
2. Data Analysis Center
•Upgrade the database analysis capabilities to maximize "searchability",
pattern determination, and predictive analyses.
Expand in-house photographic analysis capabilities (also including, but not
limited to, Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) analysis).
Maintain technical, computational, and laboratory facilities capable of physics,
chemistry, biology, and engineering (electrical, materials, nuclear, etc.) analyses.
Data analysis exchange with AFOSI. Discuss joint collection and analysis of:
1.Historical and recent cockpit recordings and ECM recordings from Air Force,
Navy, Marine, and Army.
2Records, reports, raw data and threat analyses pertaining to (but not
limited to): advanced aerospace vehicle tracking by any agency or armed
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V
service within CONUS, all data from Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Lunar and Mars
associated data (both historical and contemporary) from NASA, satellite
data on unknown targets from NRO, other uncorrelated imagery data from
NGIA, trajectory tracks of uncorrelated targets fromNORAD/NORTHCOM/MIT
Lincoln Labs etc., radar track records of uncorrelated targets from FAA and all
data (historical and contemporary) pertaining to interactions/sightings of
advanced aerospace vehicles at missile sites, nuclear weapons storage facilities,
and at Air Force bases in CONUS.
3.Advanced aerospace technology activity/behavior in other countries,
particularly Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
Deliverables:
•Monthly case reports and analyses. Special reports on historical data analyses.
3. Advanced Technology Center
The mission of the Advanced Technology Center is to establish a comprehensive
program:
First to gain access to and inventory all existing caches of Advanced
Aerospace Vehicle (AAV) materials and documentation within CONUS,
whether residing in archive storage or under active program
investigation in National Laboratories, government organizations
and/or contractors;
Secondarily to set up protocols for obtaining access to materials
newly acquired from sources both domestic and foreign;
Finally, a program of evaluation based on the best of modern
technological assessment teams and tools.
A dedicated management team will be set up to guide and oversee program actions:
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V
An in-house staff to perform technical assessment and analysis of both
hardware and documentation will be established.
Well-equipped, secure storage and laboratory facilities will be
provided for in-house investigation and evaluation activities.
In addition to in-house technical efforts, a program will be established to
harness the talents of specialists with required expertise on an as-needed
basis via both the use of in-house sabbaticals and outsourcing of
subcontracts. Of special interest in this category is contact with military
personnel and contractors presently (or retirees previously) involved in
AAV evaluation programs.
A full-time support staff to administer and expedite the above
requirements will be established.
Deliverables:
An inventory of AAV hardware, materials and documentation suitable for
archiving under appropriate security conditions in a database format will
be established.
Based on the identification of, and negotiation with, present
holders/stewards of AAV hardware, materials and documentation,
governmental or privatized, protocols for information sharing and
access will be developed.
While the above infrastructure is being established, teams of
investigators will begin a process to prioritize 'low-hanging fruit' vs.
'long-range potentials' with regard to possible disruptive-technology
exploitation and/or threat potential, in the hands of a potential
adversary, with assessment reports provided.
Based on the assessment process, a number of actions will be set in
motion:
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AN
(1Where relevant, updated (re)examination of materials with the best of
forensic technologies now available will be pursued, either in-house or at appropriate
facilities under appropriate security.
(2) Based on identification of possible advanced technological
processes being exploited, experts with the relevant expertise will be
engaged to provide useful evaluative input, either indirectly on the
basis of being asked to generate position or research papers on the
forefront aspects of the (apparent) identified technology (including best-
guess extrapolation to potential future developments), or directly by
exposure to, and examination of, the materials or technological
processes involved. Either could involve re-engagement of entities
previously involved in earlier programs to assess such materials and
technologies.
(3)Where deemed potentially of merit, in-house or outsourced
laboratory experimentation will be initiated to explore as-yet-unidentified
characteristics and functions of AA V materials and devices in the
inventory, and results reported.
Supplemental to (3) above, additional experimentation will be
undertaken, in-house or outsourced, to test various hypotheses that
emerge from examination of AAV materials and documents, medical
studies of injuries, and AAV sighting reports, and results reported.
(5) Enhance investigations to pursue attempts by foreign countries (particularly China/Russia) in
developing advanced technology breakthroughs from recovered technology items. Develop
threat assessment based on this information.
In support of the above activities, a well-structured Oral History Initiative will be undertaken
both to compile a dense database of information acquired to date, and to assist in identifying
additional sources for information acquisition, whether it be the identity of individuals,
contractors or government units and activities, foreign as well as domestic.
Over past decades a number of high-level individuals in the military, intelligence, and even
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political sectors of our goverment have had various level of exposure/access to this subject area.
This has included agency directors, members of the JCS and very senior individuals in the Executive
Branch. To this can be added certain foreign heads of state, as well as select members of the
goverment contractor community in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Oral histories from
individuals of the caliber referenced above are critical to this mission.
Data collection from an already identified and calibrated list of retired, previously
highly placed government, armed services, contractor and intelligence community
individuals.